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This thesis Is an analysis determined by the investigative 
proposition, what is a magic realist speech act? Of the schools of 
thought available to any philosophical undertaking in literature, this 
thesis makes particular use of the principles of speech act theol}', 
genre theol}', and poststructurallsm. With genre theol}', the emphasis 
is on the subgeneric construction of the narrative structure, and this 
thesis will incorporate three short stories from Peter Carey's The Fat 
Man in HlstonJ as the most overt eVIdence for what the thesis Is 
proposing to analyse and lllumlnate. But on the whole, readers will 
understand that, while the short stories analysed contribute to the 
specific concepts and notions of the thesis, the thesis itself is written 
with the purpose of being able to determine some of the conditions 
and indicators that make up the larger structure of subgenerlc magic 
realism in narratives other than Carey's. 
With speech act theol}' and poststructurallsm, the thesis will 
focus essentially on the dialogue between John. R. Searle (1979) and 
Jacques Derrlda (1979) on the work of the founder of speech act 
theol}', John. L. Austin ( 1962). The impetus of that dialogue Is the 
distinction made, by Austin and Searle, between serious discourse, or 
ordinary language, and non~serious discourse, or fictional discourse. 
This distinction is argued to be. by speech act philosophers, a 
necessal}' condition of being able to establish a general theolY of 
speech acts, or felicitous performances, that can be classified 
according to their illocutionary forces in ordinary circumstances. 
Derrida, however, proposes that such felicitous performances, in any 
circumstance, can be established if, and only if, one considers their 
infelicitous, or parastic, counterpart In fictional dlscurslvily as an 
object of analysis to speech act theol}' rather than an object of 
exclusion. In what may generally be considered a Derrldean approach, 
this thesis will place such an exclusive binal}' opposition 'under 
erasure' to show that the principles of speech act theol}' are wholly 
applicable to non-serious discourse and su bgenerlc narrative 
structures, which In our case Is magic realism. Indeed, this thesis will 
take, as Its point of departure. the notion that the erasure between 
serious and nop.-sertous discourse Is already In place, thereby allowing 
the argument to concentrate on the principles of speech act theol}' in 
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t1ctional discourse as well as Its wider applicability to the 
construction of any su bgenerlc act In genre theory. 
Finally, a considerable focus Is given to \he notion of closure In 
fictional discourse between Author Function and Reader Function. 
Using Carey as an example, the thesis will look at how subgenerlc 
magic realism foregrounds both poststructural play and narrative 
closure, entertaining the possibility of the two, according to the 
respective contexts of each condition on the quantum level and larger 
structure of a narrative's performance. Furthermore, this possible 
duality of language, this aporia, Is, In this thesis, held to he common 
to all subgenres, known and unknown to genre theory, as well as to 
the performances of language In both the literary and extra-literary 
realities. 
i .. ' 
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l11itroduction: "Positions". 
Because our position, In this thesis, engages In an analysts 
which consists of the principles of speech act theory and genre theory, 
It will be beneficial for readers to bear In mind the familiar model of 
the Functions of Language tbeortsed by Roman Jakobson (1960). This 
model, and Its six basic functions, Is schematically reproduced as 
follows; 
con .. ext 
(Jal<otmn, 1960:353). 
Jakobson offered this model of linguistic functions, at a 
conference on style ln language, within the context of establishing the 
poetic function as a viable extensJon of the J.ingutstic enterprise. 
Poetics, for Jakobson, 'deals primarily with the question, What makes 
a verbal message a work of art?' (I 960:350), and It Is this principle 
that he sought to Illuminate and apply to linguistic evaluations of 
artfulness. Because literary studies and linguistic studies focus on the 
nature of the vet bal message In Its relevant contexts, the poetics that 
Is the 'focal portion' (1960:352) of l!tcrary studies, In analysing the 
verbal message, Is wholly applicable to the linguistic enterprise as a 
function, just like the other functions In the above schema. 
However, Jakobson states that, '(b]efore discussing the poetic 
function we must define its place among the other functions of 
language· (1960:353). The model of the six basic functions, therefore, 
Is no different from the popular ordinary language approach, 
undertaken by many philosophers, In their attempt to draw 
distinctions between communication In ordinary circumstances and 
'literary' circumstances. For Jakobson, Its purpose Is to set up a 
dividing llne between the ordinary message and the literary message, 
so that the poetic function Is shown to be responsible for the crossing 
of that communicative line when poetics Is applied to linguiStics as It 
IE used In literary studies. Thus Jakobsen's schema Is designed to 
explain the functions of language In ordinary circumstances. before he 
can explain the operative nature of the poetic function amongst these 
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ordlnacy language functions. 
The moves that follow, In Jakobson's argument, are destgned to 
produce a further schema, s!mllarly based on the six basic functions 
of ordlnacy language In communication, that illuminate the poetic 
function's operative nature not only in an appropriate sense to Ute.ary 
studies, but also as a methodology wholly applicable to the analysis of 
poetic communication In linguistic studies. The conclusion Is that the 
poetic function In the literacy model Is equivalent to the message 
function In the ordlnacy model. 
Jakobson argues that '[p]oetic function Is not the sole function 
of verbal art but only Its dominant, determining function, w:1ereas In 
all other verbal activities It acts as a subsldlacy, accessocy 
constituent' (1960:356). And because the poetic function Is dominant, 
verbal arl, as object of analysis In literacy and linguistic studies, has 
Its message wholly determined by the hegemony of tl1e poetic function 
over the other functions. Jakobson states that '[ t]he set ... toward the 
MESSAGE as such, focus on the message for Its own sake, Is the 
POETIC function of language' (1960:356). Jakobson's second schema 
(1960:357) tries to show this relationship by structuring a model that 
does not implicate the same, ordinary, functions, where the function 
of the message Is equal to the other functions, but special literacy 
derivatives of those functions, centred on the importance of the 
message, even though they are grounded In a model designed to 
explain ordinary circumstances. Jakobsen's second schema is, in part, 
the structuralist answer to the problem of distinguishing ordlnacy 
language use and poetic language use by the Implied difference In the 
way messages are constructed. 
Whlle I do not disagree with Jakobson's first schema, as 
reproduced In this Introduction, I find the notion of his second 
schema of poetic language rather problematic to literacy studies and 
Itngutst!c studies. Indeed, this Implied difference Is one that creeps up 
In speech act theocy when Austin ( 1962) and Searle (1970) are both 
adamant that ordlnacy language, as the object of analysing 
performatives and their lllocut!ons, must be .considered first and 
foremost over their fictional derivatives, or non-serious 
representations. We will have recourse to this difference later in the 
Introduction, and the thesis In general. But, for the moment, we can 
state that the notion of a poetic language has been proven to be a 
fallacy due to the poststructural strategy towards language, and the 
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postmodern condition of pastiche In the extra-literary reality. 
Jakobsen's second schema, therefore, cannot but collapse Its Implied 
difference Into the ordinary language model on which It Is based, and 
from which It trtes to escape. 
The notion of trylug to determine the artfulness of a verbal 
message, as different from an ordinary message, cannot be removed 
from the other basic functions of the frrst schema, and cannot be 
removed.from the ordinary circumstances of language, from the langue 
and parole, In which literary discourse Is lntrtnslcally grounded and of 
which 1t ls a part. Furthennore, to argue that verbal art produces 
messages for its own sake, without any recourse to the conditions 
that m<.ike up the message, Is to say that verbal a.t exists In a 
communicative vacuum of its own making, 8':-J.ci cannot be analysed 
beyond such an isolated existence. This has, cf course, been proven to 
be a fallacy by such schools of thought as marxism, feminism, and 
postcolontallsm. The literary message and the ordinary message, like 
the ficllonal speech act and the ordinary speech act, are Inextricable 
from each other because of their Interdependency on the dialogic 
nature of speakers who use them. 
Let us, then, bear in mind Jakobsen's first schema as we 
Investigate textual utte•·ances by speech act principles and genre 
theory throughout this thesis. But first we must rewrite the schema 
somewhat In order to show the appllcablity of one model to both the 
literary and extra-literary performances of speech acts. Indeed, the 
changes that follow are minor, gtven the argument of this thesis and 
the nature of thought in current philosophical S~:'!hools on literature 
and language. Consider the following as a comparison between our 
schema and J:akobson's schema: 
context 
- -
Author Function production/lranslixenoe of Irffil1lng Reader Function 
- g=e/su~ -
axle 
At first glance, our schema may be considered as just another 
derivative of an ordinary language model In a literary circumstance. 
This, I will a<gue, Is misconceived. Both Author Function and Reader 
Function are Interchangeable w_tth addresser and addressee, but serve ,' 
to Illuminate the functions to which both the addresser and the 
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addressee are committed In the production and transference of 
meaning. Indeed, the notion of Author Function Is based on 
Foucault's (1986: I 19) proposition that the authnr ls a constraining 
figure through which the potential of fictional dlscurslvliles pass and 
are organised according to the copyright of the proper name, the 
styllstics associated with that proper name, and the body of work that 
constitutes the proper name as an existence separate from the actual 
person. In this sense, Reader Function ls Its complementary literary 
position ln determining those processes that sanctify the name and 
the body of work, as well as belng a position committed to producing 
and transferring a message that Is considered to have a meaning 
relevant to the text ln question, or work ln general. As Iser (1989:78) 
has stated, the reader climbs aboard the text and ln doing so, accepts 
certain given perspectives which interact with themselves and with 
him or herself. 
This acceptance, or commitment, ls further based on the 
Bakhtinian concept of dlalogtsm (1981) so that the message ls both 
tbe product of the other functions as well as the ongotng commitment 
of the speakers to each other ln the dynanucs of a public dialogue. As 
we can see ln our schema by the representative arrows, the message is 
not unidirectional. as ln Jakobson's schema, but dialogic and 
Interdependent on all the functions of the model. This amendment. 
whlle betng based on the p:,nosophy of M. M. Bakhtln, further 
benefits from its ablllty to Incorporate both poststructuralism and the 
Saussurean model of language, or langue. 
Genre and subgenre are also Important to both the llterary and 
the extra-llterary reallties because they help to generate and maintain 
a level of contact that ls appropriate to a particular performatlve 
Interchange, or, once again, a dialogue. In the llterary reallty, this ls 
quite common and generally accepted, even lf lt ls challenged from 
tlme to tlme, but ln the extra-llterary reallty, the genre and subgenre 
play a particular role ln the underdeveloped theory of speech genres. 
Furthermore, the notion of genre and subgenre as the contactjunctlon 
compiles with the requirements of genre theory, where genre lmpl!es 
the medium, In our case the short story, and subgenre Implies Its 
propositional content, which ln our case ls magic realism. Depending 
on the genre and subgenre being used, this process is equally 
applicable to the notion of contact ln the extra-literary reality. For 
us, however, it ls Important in the sense that uur future discussion on 
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appropriateness conditions nnd subgenerlc indicators Is based on the 
notion that such conditions and indicators function to maintain a 
contact between the Author Function and the Reader Function In 
order to communicate the felicities and Infelicities of an lllocutlon In 
a specific narrative performance. 
While the code and context do r,ot, lr! '!eneral, alter their 
-
conceptual functions from Jakobsen's schema to our schema, we 
must Include the postructural strategy towards language to which 
Jakobson had not been exposed at the time of theorising his 
structural model. With regard to the rode, the ability for the Author 
Function and the Reader Function to check up on the signifying 
nature of the language used can amount to closure If. and only If. as 
Bakhtln would argue (1981), the potential of the word Is realised In 
the context of another speaker, namely either the Author Function or 
the Reader Function. Thus the possibility for closure In a speech act, 
In both the literary and extra-literary realities, will depend on the 
awareness of the dialogue that Will follow. Even though there Is a gap 
in the production and transference of meaning of a literary context, 
one cannot conclude from the existence of this gap that closure 
cannot be obtained In the face of play. There Is a variety of methods In 
which a Reader Function can check up on the possible messages of 
the Author Function in order that he or she may complement the 
strongest closure of those messages In a dialogic state of Authority. 
This will be discussed In chapter three of the thesis. 
With respect to the context. the change that occurs to the 
schema Is also poststructurai. As we have already discussed regarding 
the code, and as Jacques Derrlda I 1979) had originally pointed out in 
terms of speech act theory, an Indeterminate amount of play occurs by 
the ever-shifting grapheme from context to context prior to Its being 
classified as a signature, or mark, In the locution. This Is particularly 
useful when examining the subgenre of magic realism, as we shall do 
In this thesis, but It does not Imply that a multiplicity of contexts has 
the predominant Influence over the Inability to obtain closure In a 
larger structure. or the plethora of acts In a subgenerlc narrative. 
Indeed. In the extra-l!terary speech act. a multiplicity of contexts 
shifts through the dialogue of two speakers but these contexts do not 
necessarily Imply that closure Is an Impossibility. We may argue that 
closure Is tentative between two speakers at any given time, but this 
still does not sacrifice closure to the plurality of contexts In 
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graphematlc play. Once again, the notion of code can help to close off 
such play, even when a closure contains, as it does in magic realism, 
the appropriateness conditions of multiple contexts extracted from the 
ever shifting grapheme. This combination of code and context forms 
much of the assumptions and arguments Oil closure and play 
throughout this thesis when we examine both the quantum level and 
the larger structure in three of Carey's short stories. 
All in all, our schematic model, based on Jakobson's Functions 
q{Language, is useful to readers of this thesis as a point of departure 
for the argu1nents that are yet to come. I will have only minor recourse 
to the model because of word economy, so readers are here made 
aware that, while it is more or less absent in a lexical sense, its 
conceptual presence should always be noted. 
I have already mentioned the poetic language distinction made 
by Austin. For Austin (1962), the distinction specitlcally takes the 
form of non-serious dtscou,-se, S!lch as fiction, poetry or theatre, as 
opposed to serious discourse, or ordinary language. The obJect of 
analysis for speech act theory is. according to Austin, the 
illocutionary force of ordinary language because its semantic 
performance is determined by the sor.::ial conventions that classify it as 
a certain performative type. Austin states (1962:22) that non-serious 
discourse falls under the classification of the eUolattons of language, 
and, therefore, illocutionary force cannot apply to the parasite of an 
ordinary performance because, under those circumstances, we do not 
hold the speaker responsible to the speech act he or she had just 
uttered. 
However, a few pages later, when Austin (1962:27) discusses the 
notion of a performative misfire, he refers hts readers to Don Quixote 
as an example of how and why a misfire may occur within the context 
of the code of honour and challenges laid in duelling. If non-serious 
discourse, or fictional discourse is an etiolation, then why invoke a 
parasitic example to explain the performatlve misfire in an ordinary 
circumstance? It is my contention that a parasitic discourse, such as 
prose narrative, poetry or theatre, is just as capable of issuing an 
lllocutlon in both the literary and extra-literary realities as Is the 
ordinary, or serious discourse of speech act theory. But let us 
continue with this problem. 
Searle ( 1979:68) argues for much the same end as Austin when 
tt comes to the distinction between serious and non~sertous 
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discourses, but he is generous enough to give the non-serious, or the 
parasite, the lllocutlonary force and act of pretending as long as It Is 
grounded within the intentionality of the author's written utterance. 
Thus a difference between Austin and Searlte, on the notion of an 
lllocutlon, Is foregrounded by the fact that Austlnlan lllocutlon ts 
determined by the social conventions of public speakers, whereas 
Searlean lllocuUon Is determined by the Intentions of the individual 
speaker to the codes and conventions oflanguage use. 
We will return to this problematic difference In chapter three, 
but for now It will suffice for readers to understand that, within the 
context of Searlean lllocutlon and fictional dlscursMty, the most an 
author can do Is pretend rather than promise, or pretend rather than 
command, or pretend rather than any of the other lllocutlons that 
apply to serious 'Jiscourse. As Searle argues, 'the author of a work of 
fiction pretends-, to perform a series of illocutionacy acts, normally of 
the assertive type' (1979:65). Aild '[w}hat makes It a work of fiction Is, 
so to speak, the lil<>C:.!Iion:>.:y stance that the author takes tcNard It, 
and that stance Is a matter of complex lllocutlonary Intentions that 
the author has when he writes or otherwise composes it' (1979:65-66). 
Searlean lllocutton in fictional discourse is the act of 
pretending, first, last, and always. This Is what Searle (1979) tenned 
as the logical status of fictional discourse In the essay of the same 
title. Thus the hidden assumption being made by such a conclusion Is 
that speech act theory can only speak of the Ulocutlonary force and 
act of pretending when It comes to Its analytical application Ia non-
serious discourse. Even when Searle (1979:73-74). clUng the opening 
utterance of AnnaKarentna as an example. admits that an author can 
inject serious utterances into a novel, he concludes that while the 
opening sentence is a genuine assertion and not a fictional pretence, 
under such circumstances, tt serves as a part of the novel but is not a 
part of the fictional story. 
1 find Searle's conclusions, regarding Anna Karenlna and 
fictional discourse In general, an attenuation of the scope of the 
theory within the total use of language between the llterary and extra-
literary realities. It may be right to argue that speech act theory has 
Its llmltatlons, but I do not think that the non-serious, the parasite, 
or flctlonal discourse, Is one of them, becauae Its lllocuttonary status 
In the extra-llterary reality can often exceed that of mere pretence. The 
problem Is, of course, a classic dilemma In the history of both western 
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philosophy and l!terary theory. Searle foregrounds this problem quite 
neatly with hls desire to build up knowledge of the lllocutlon on the 
underlying force of Platonism, or the western appropriation and 
Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms by Its grandeur as a system 
made up of pure things and their variants. Thus, from the outset of 
establishing a body of knowledge called speech act theory, Searle 
states that while 'concepts In ordinary language lack absolutely strict 
rules', he will direct hls analysis 'at the center of the concept of a 
performance and wlll tgnore 'marginal. fringe, and partially defective' 
variants of the performatlve In question (1970:55). This Is, of course, 
an open Invitation for a rigidly playful attack on Searle through the 
poststructural strategy towards language, anct brtngs us to the further 
problem of the binary opposition In systems of knowledge and 
processes of thought. 
Both Searle and Austin allow for the felicitous performance of 
an act within the strictly hard and fast structure of a binary 
opposition. Searle argues that 'the pretended lllocutions which 
constitute a work of fiction are made possible by the existence of a set 
of conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules 
relating lilocutionary acts and the world' ( 1979:67). And Austin, as we 
have already stated, argues that '(!language In such circumstances Is 
In special ways -Intelligibly- used not seriously, but In ways parasitic 
upon its normal use -ways which fall under the doctrine of the 
eUolatlons oflanguage· (1962:22). For Austin and Searle. what is at the 
left of the binary opposition has a relevant, platonic purity, of which 
the right side cannot but be Its parasitic variant that wlll corrupt the 
body of knowledge they are trying to establish. Thus serious/ non-
serious dlscurslvlty Is akin to the ordinary I parasite distinction that 
marks the need for purity and rtgour on the left, and marginal 
exclusions, or etiolated corruptions on the right. Their distinction of 
serious/ non-serious dtscurstvtty is no different frmn the structuralist 
desire, which we discussed concerning Roman Jakobsen, for a poetic 
language system that has distinctions from the langue of everyday use, 
or ordinary speech. 
Since, however, both fictional discourse and ordinary discourse 
share the common denominators of rules In the expressing and 
understanding of messages, we must consider how great the difference 
actually Is between serious and non-serious dlvlslons. Thus one of the 
underlying forces that directs this thesis Is based on the notion that 
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when Searle and Austin exclude the non-serious for fear of corrupting 
the serious. they wlll find their thought marked by the stain of the 
parasite, and they will find their theories continually slipping Into the 
corruption from which they think they have escaped. To speak magic 
realist Is to speak by the rules, rtgour. and illocutions of the non-
serious, and to be able speak in those non-serious illocutlons reflects 
our ability to speak tn the ordinary speech that exists tn the totalizing 
forces of language. There may be a marked difference tn the way we 
apprehend and understand the literary and the extra-literary reality, 
but that difference Is only minor when It comes to the illocutions that 
constitute It In a linguistic sense. 
Furthermore, we must ask to what degree both Austin and 
Searle participate In the poetic language fallacy that plagued 
structuralism In Its desire for an holistically separate system of 
poetics, or fictionally orchestrated language. As Pratt states, '[tJhe fact 
that...there Is a real langue shared by literary and non-literary 
utterances alike Is quite overlooked and seems almost Irrelevant to the 
line of argument these quotations indicate' ( 1977: 10). Equally, she 
argues that '[a[ll utterances take place against the background of a 
whole range of contemporary norms governing what styles, what 
subject matter, what degrees of formality, politeness, and so on are 
appropriate tn differe>'t contexts' (1977: 10). While this problem of the 
poetic language fallacy Is wdl-known to literary theory when It comes 
to discourse and crittctsm, it seems to have gone unnoticed in speech 
act theory, and gone unnoticed In the philosophy of language In which 
Austin and Searle were writing. I will not elaborate on the problem 
any further because, In Its current simplicity, the notion of a poetic 
language fallacy allows readers of this thesis to understand Its 
implications to speech act theory In much the same way as It plagued 
structuralism and its predecessor, Russian Formalism. 
Derrlda (Limited Inc, abc., or Lim. 1979:240) argues that, while 
Austin and Searle both recognise that the parasite Is part of ordinary 
language, It did not stop them from excluding It In their analysis of 
serious discourse. Thus for Derrlda, Austin's concept of ordinary 
language, as It Is formed In the context of speech act theory, 'Is clearly 
marked by this exclusion' (Lim. 1979:241), even though the object of 
exluslon, the parasite, Is clearly a part of the concept of the ordinary 
from the outset. In both 'Signature, Event, Context' and 'Limited Inc., 
abc .. .', Derrlda Is adamant that such an exclusion of the parasite Is 
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liable to put the question of fellcltles and lnfellclties, appllcable to 
lllocutionary acts and the purity of performatives, under corruption 
when classifying serious types of dlscurslvlty, since the parasite can 
and wlll always return to corrupt the health and happiness of the 
performance and the theory. 
In his answer to Searle's notion of a logical status for fictional 
dlscurslvlty, Derrtda (Lim. 1979:239) points to Searle's own admission 
that the SLarlean theory of speech acts Is but a part of an overall 
theory that does not yet exist and, for Denida, this Is evidence enough 
that Searle's treatise on parasitism and its logical status of 
lllocutionary pretending Is but a parasite Itself of the whole theory of 
speech acts. The problem for Searle, as seen by Derrlda, Is that the 
parasite cannot be excluded from speech act theory, and cannot be 
excluded from the notion of an ordinary language and Its !llocutions 
in any circumstance. The conclusion is one that dismisses the 
perforreance of any performative unless It Is the dellberatlon of both 
its fellclties and lnfellctties, rather than an lllocutlonary type decided 
by •exclusion. As Derrtda states, '[!)he parasitic structure Is what I 
have tried to analyze everywhere, under the names of writing, mark, 
step [marche], margin, d![ferance, graft, undecidable, supplement, 
pharmakon, hymen, parergon, etc.' (L!rn. 1979:247). 
Derrlda (Signature, Event, Context .. or Sec. 1979) can thereby 
argue that to classify writing as a parasitic dependant of speech 
Ulumlnates the fundamental position which Austin holds to the truth 
value of speech over wrltir.g, a belief upheld In a history of western 
philosophy where speech Is closer to the real than writing, and where 
speech Is the proper vehicle for the dellvery of knowledge and truth, as 
well as being that which Is the most fruitful Investigation for 
understanding communication. But, as we are aware by the 
roststructural strategy towards language, both speech and writing 
function In a relationship that Is dependent on the tterablllty of the 
grapheme In a multipllcity of contexts because both speech and 
writing are the products of signatures, marked and remarked, In a 
system of d![ferance rather than the singular purity of stgns and 
concepts. And so, In the hierarchy (speech/ writing), both performattve 
modes exist by the warring forces of slgnlllcation In a playful system, 
or langue, whe: , such warring Is equal to the shift that can mark a 
felicity an Infelicity. 
What Derrlda wants to affirm Is that parole, or speech, 
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functions no differently from writing due to the grapheme's ab!llty to 
play within, and reiterate, a multiplicity of contexts. Petrey states that 
'parts of "Signature, Event, Context" repeat Derrlda's conviction that 
problems on the locutlonary level must be addressed before the 
lllocutlonary level can be productively approached' ( 1990: 139). 
Because writing Is first and foremost a graphematlc, or quotable, 
signifier In a narcissistic performance rather than a locutlonary one, 
speech Itself, by Its signatory tie to Its graphematlc state, Is able to be 
extracted from codes and contexts only to be Injected, with surgical 
precision. IntO other codes and contexts, thus acquiring a multipilclty 
of meanings by a potential play In a multiplicity of lllocutlons. 
Norris (1987: 178) mal<es this point quite clear when he has 
recourse to Derrlda's ab!Uty, In 'Limited Inc., abc .. .', to extract, and 
Inject Into other contexts, large sections of Searle's essay, 'Reiterating 
the Differences: a reply to Derrlda', so he can prove his point that 
performativlty In language, whether written or spoken, Is always faced 
with the danger of slipping back to Its graphematlc level rather than 
maintaining, as Searle would have It, the !llocutlonary level of a single 
context. Thus the analysis of a serious performance must acknowledge 
its debt to its non-serious counterpart if it is to avoid a performative 
misfire, or Infelicity, as discussed by Austin (1962). What this further 
means for us Is the need to address the quantum level of language 
alongside our Investigation of Its larger structure, the subgenerlc 
narrative, in order to maintain a closure that is relevant to the 
common denominators between the two. As I have said earlier in this 
Introduction, closure Is based on a dialogic state of Authority. 
Much of Searle's 'Reiterating the Differences: a reply to Derr!da' 
Is an argument that plays directly Into Derr!da's hands. Searle reads 
Derrida in the same way as he had read Austin, and tries to dominate 
h!s authority In the realm of speech act theory. Searle's downfall Is 
due to his overt desire not to understand the Implications of 
poststructural!sm and language, writing It off as a misreading of 
Austin. In this sense, Searle (Reply. 1979:204) remains quite adamant 
that, If one Is to constru ot a general speech act theory of ordinary 
langnage use and Its felicitous and lnfellcltlous performances, then 
one should not be analysing the parasites, such as fiction or theatre, 
of ordinary language. 
Aligning himself with Austin, Searle (Reply. 1979:204) reiterates 
the problem of an actor making a promise on stage by stating that an 
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audience does not hold the actor responsible for that promise, once 
the performance Is over. To say that the actor Is logically pretending to 
make a promise Is not the same as saytng that the rules of making a 
promise In speech act theory are Inapplicable to literature. The 
audience knows that the performance of the play will end within a 
specific, Unear, tlmespace, and that In this sense It may be 
pretending, but this does not preclude the audience from 
understanding that the character has made a promise of a certain 
lllocuttonary type. and that he or she Is Uable to social conventions 
during the tlmespace that marks the literary reality of the play. This Is 
equally Derrtda's point (Lim. 1979:231) and to this end, speech act 
theory needs to Include, as I have continually suggested, the parasite 
within Its explanatory scope and power. 
Ommundsen (1993:3), discussing the self-reflexive status of 
texts, also points out that some texts clearly have an Impact on the 
extra-literary reality, the most recent being Salman Rushdle's The 
Satanic Verses. That ts rather an impossible feat for a non·serlous 
parasite In the Searlean scheme of things where Its logical status Is 
simply that of lllocutlonary pretending. In such a case, the binary 
opposition of ordinary I parasite, or serious/ non-serious, Is clearly 
demolished and speech act theory must Include fictional discourse, Its 
felicities and Infelicities, to the very same doctrinal rtgour that It 
carries out In classifying the lllocu tlonary force and act of serious 
discourse In the extra-literary reality. 
Finally, the charge made by Fish (1980:221. 227. 244) that 
speech act theory Is only applicable to speech act texts, seems to both 
Petrey (1990: I 01) and me to be an enforced limitation placed on the 
potential scope and power of the theory's explar.atory principles. Fish 
argues that while 'a speech-act analysts of such texts will always be 
possible, It will also be trivial (a mere list of the occurrence or 
distribution of the kinds of acts), because. while It Is the conditions of 
tntelllgtblllty that make all texts possible, not all texts are about those 
conditions' (1980:245). Fish proves his point by a rigid, Searlean. 
speech act analysts of Shakespeare's Coriolanus, concluding that 
'Coriolanus Is about these conditions, and It goes the theory one better 
by also being about their fraglllty' (1980:245). 
Readers will note the emphasis I place on the Searlean aspect of 
Fish's analysts, with which we are famlllar enough by now to know 
that It places many restrictions not only on the literary text, but also 
on the theory In general because of the exclusion of the parasitic 
perform.-cmce. If Fish Is convinced that not all texts are about speech 
act conditions, then Is he also convinced that not all ordinary 
utterances are about speech act conditions? Speech act theory Is more 
concerned with illuminating the types of illocutlonary forces Issued 
during particular utterances In a performance rather than just 
analysing speech acts which overtly display their felicitous conditions. 
Furthermore, this type of an Investigation does not necessarily need to 
be wholly confined to a list of illocutlons In ordinary language 
circumstances, because such a confinement will generally be based on 
an exclusion of other poseible felicities and Infelicities. or 
appropriateness conditions. of an act In Its variant performances. 
Indeed, my position Is marked by the appllcab1lity of speech act 
theory to literary discourse and the subgenres In which It participates. 
It Is my contention that speech act theory Is more applicable to, and 
Identifiable with, fictional discourse than It Is with ordinary 
discourse. This Is because the 'appropriateness conditions· (Pratt, 
1977) for a particular performance are readily Identifiable with the 
subgenerlc narratives from they seem to play originally, and because 
the narratives under investigation tend to be much more conducive to 
the felicities and Infelicities needed as evidence prior to classifYing an 
illocution. 
A speech act theorist has more accessible information when he 
or she Is dealing with a text than when he or she Is dealing with 
classifying an act in a social circumstance between two unknown 
speakers in the immediacy of dynamic performances in a conversation. 
Thus the text bears a multiplicity of appropriateness conditions. both 
of a practlcBl type and a subgenerlc type, which will determine the 
illocutlons of subgenerlc indicators. We will begin our journey with 
the subgenerlc type of appropriateness conditions as a rich source of 
Identifying and qualifYing the types of illocutlons In parasitical 
utterances. This amounts to a mulUcontextualtty in performance that 
Is not only foregrounded In the subgenre called magic realism, but 
also common to allsubgenres, known and unknown. 
While I wtll not debate Fish's point any further here, I hope that 
readers will find sufficient evidence In the thesis as to why speech act 
theory Is useful In a literary context, and why the authority of the 
theory should not be placed just In the hands of a select few, such as 
John. R. Searle. Under such circumstances, the theory Is In danger of 
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dying In a rather narrow context and, If the current state of literary 
criticism Is any indication, the death of speech act theory In a 
fictional, or parasitic context, has been rather swift and well 
sustained. Speech act theory should be placed In an Interpretative 
environment where Austinlan principles can be openly debated within 
the context of both the ordinary and parasitic performances as they 
apply to the authority of Interpretative communities. 
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O..e: Appi'Opliateness Conditions: 'Report on the Shad.ow Industry'. 
Having outlined our position as to the principles of speech act 
theory In parasitic discourse, we must address another Important 
preliminary. We need to define a subgenertc concept Insofar as we can 
explore both Its 'graphematlc' playfulness and Its ablllty to execute 
closure by nature of the appropriateness conditions In Hs 
construction. It Is only until we have come to some agreed upon 
understanding of the concept of magtc realtsm, by Us 'shadows', that 
we can proceed to discuss its operative nature as one type of parasitic 
speech act In the myriad of subgenertc acts and their appropriateness 
condltlons. Pratt states that '[o]ne of the most obvious kinds of 
contextual information we bring to bear In confronting a literary work 
Is our knowledge of Us genre .... [G ]enres and subgenres can to a great 
extent be defined as systems of appropriateness conditions' (1977:86). 
And Todorov argues that '[a] new genre Is always the transformation of 
an earlier one, or of several: by Inversion, by displacement, by 
combtnation .... There has never been a literature without genres; 1t is a 
system In constant transformation .. .' [1990:15). 
Todorov's notion of genre and subgenre differs from our usage of 
the two terms as outlined In the Introduction. For Todorov [1973), the 
notion of genre Is synonomous with both media and propositional 
content, whereas his subgenrc is a mixture of the conditions of two 
genres that combine to form an Interactive variant of the main gt.~nre 
under Investigation. This scenario will be further lllumlnateCI In 
chapter two when we discuss the fantastic indicator. For us, however, 
the term genre Is synonomous with the notion of media, and the tenn 
subgenre with propositional content Thus what we are proposing to 
Investigate In this chapter, and also the thesis, Is how subgenerlc 
magic realism, as the propositional content of the contactjunctton, can 
place certain demands on the Author Function's intentions in 
narrative, and how those intentions translate to the Reader Function 
by way of Indicators and appropriateness conditions In the narrative. 
As Sage states of the Carey narrative, '[wJhen the whole collection Is 
laid end to end ... [lt is] striking how continuous, and continuously 
famlllar, the baste terrain Is' [ 1995:19. My Italics). 
Furthermore, this chapter examines, through magic realism, 
how subgenres constitute themselves, by way of appropriateness 
condltlons, because the system undergoes constant transformations. 
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And since It Is a system In constant transformation, the conditions 
can slip from the larger subgenerlc structures Into the graphematic, or 
quantum, level of language, only to reinstate themselves In other 
larger structures as subgenerlc Indicators. This notion Is of primary 
Importance to this thesis. 
Dealing, then, with magic realism as a subgene11c concept, our 
focus Is to Illuminate Its appropriateness conditions and how they are 
grounded In the mu!Upllclty of subgenerlc acts, rather than existing as 
exclusive conditions of some idealistic subgenre. Instead of defining the 
concept in a reductive sense, I intend to explore some of its 
capabilities as a subgenre by the techniques it appropriates and 
validates In the course of its narrative potential. One Important point 
to bear In mind with the concept of magic realism Is Illuminated by 
Linda Kenyon (1985) who argues that both words In the term must 
have equal weight In order for one to understand that the subgenre Is 
firmly grounded In realism. and not some type of magtcal writing of 
and for Itself. Because there Is no firm definition of magic realism, the 
term tends to be considered problematic. The majority of crltlcs and 
theorists do not specialize In attempting to Illuminate Its principles, 
and use it, as they use most polemic labels, as a casual reference. 
Since confusion of the term occurs, casual references cannot 
but construct magic realism's Infantile conceptuality Into a less than 
attractive, subgenerlc package for people, like Peter Carey, who do not 
Intend to do battle on the polemic field of literary theories. In these 
circumstances, the concept generally tends to be either forgotten or 
abandoned altogether, and an Author Function's ability to use the 
subgenerlc concept can become seriously damaged. As Carey states, 'I 
liked the term magtc reailsm when I first heard it .... Then later it 
became a tag that was thrown around so much thalli started to get 
soiled. In my mind it became a sort of cheap cliche. I became wary of 
being labeled a magtc realist. In a funny way I no longer feel that I am 
writing in this way .... It's less magic, more real (W!llbanks,l991:55·56. 
My italics). Although Carey's statement Is relative to a discussion of 
his novels, It can also be considered appropriate to his short stories. 
In an earlier lnterv1ew with Craig Munro (1977:186), Carey Is quite 
adamant about liking to begin W1th either reality, or an extension of 
reality, In his short stories, so that he can work his way Into 
fabullsm. And In a later lnterv1ew with John Maddocks, Carey states 
that: 
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As tar as fm concerned II\Y stories are all set In the present, with llttle 
tricks and mere =uses to Imke peop'e accept them Basi<'aJiy rm 
always wrttlng about how the work! Is now. Ojten charocters are 
dm!l'. viurflreull!fe, wrllhey are tn the relallvely sunrol,less mlumllsli: 
sta1es as much as tn the more ratumUstr ones .... It's just II\Y way of 
looking at the world. fm just bying to klok at It more clearly. Uke If 
you put your head between your legs and look at the work! up>kle 
down, evecythlng seems at onre the same and}<'! the cok>urs "F..Il 
Imre Intense. You see It slightly dlli:ren~ and that's all fm bying to 
do In the short stories (1981:38-39. My ltalk:s). 
For our purposes, both these statements made by Carey come as 
close to an understanding of magic realism as any. When Carey states 
that his writing Is 'less magic, more real', and so removed from the 
constraints of a cliched label like magic realism, It Is hard to agree 
with Carey that he has actually moved beyond the subgenre he 
believes to be 'soiled'. This seems to be particularly apt when we 
consider that his working principle Is to begin with reality, or an 
extension of reality, In order to move toward a technique used In 
magic realism, namely fabulation, which I will discuss later In the 
chapter. Indeed, the fact that the stories portray both character and 
situation in a combination of surrealism and naturalism indicates 
that the appropriateness conditions work to broaden the Reader 
Function's understanding of his or her !nd!Vldual perspectives to 
reality. The stories, therefore, ground themselves, by the demands of 
magic realism, in the C.ual semantic importance. stressed by Kenyon, 
of magic and reality. 
Nevertheless, Carey does allude to the legitimate point about 
the way tn which critics can misunderstand their positions vls-i'l.-v!s 
the subgenre, or any categorical term for that matter, by preferring to 
validate their own critical position of the term rather than attempting 
to understand it. For, If one employs categorical labels, then one must 
equally explain their usage, not only In one's own discourse, but also 
within tile discursive context of another. As we stated In the 
Introduction, with the help of M. M. Bakhttn (1981), our notion of the 
production and transference of meaning Is based on a dialogic state of 
Authority. An absence of Investigative thought by the dialogic state of 
Authority can lead to an equal absence In understanding that 
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concepts and utterances do have conditions which render them 
particular to a group, type, or larger structure. This has added to the 
current confusion not just over magic realism, but also evecy other 
term. When terms such as fabullsm, metaftctlonality, postmodem!Sm, 
and postcolonlallsm are taken to be synonymic explanations of magic 
realism, literacy critics are, In fact, articulating quite separate 
concepts and practices In their casual references to explain Carey's 
subgenertc performances. 
What, then, are we dealing with? Let us consider first an extract 
from Carey's 'Report on the Shadow lndustcy' for an understanding of 
magic realism as subgenre and concept; 
"You see !IDJlle tn daJk glasses wandertng;:uound the supennarkets 
at 2 AM. There are ~t lx:!xffi an akmg the aLsles, some as expen.sM! 
as 8fiy dollars but most of them only IM. There's always Muzak. It 
gJres me the shlts more than the shadows. The people don~ klok at 
one another. They come to l:rowse through the lx:!xffi of shadows 
although the packets g).Ve no tndlcatbn ofwhafs tnsi:le ... " (1974:91). 
De Reyna states that '[t[he magic reallst approach holds a 
"mirror up to nature" to record the minutest detail ... it doesn't "dece~ve 
the eye": It enchants the eye [1973:9). It Is this attention to 
'meticulous detail that Is the hallmark of magic reallsm' ( 1979:9). 
From De Reyna's position, magic realism does not seem far removed 
from the traditional understanding of reallsm. However, it is this 
focus on 'meticulous detail' that allows the magic realist speech act to 
indulge In the fantastical nature of the environment depleted by the 
narrative while simultaneously grounding such a movement wholly 
within the literacy and extra-literacy boundaries of both Author 
Function and Reader Function. It Is thts movement, this synecdochic 
enchantment, that captures the mind's eye of the Reader Function by 
the narrative potential laid down by the Author Function. The 
synecdochic enchantment of magic realism Is the quality by which a 
meticulous attention to detall relfies both realism and Its microcosmic 
magic, represented In the narrative, through the artistic 
substantiation of culture, as the base principle 'If the subgenre. It Is by 
the demands of this base principle that the enchantment within the 
narrative structure Is an orchestrated reflection of the structures and 
culturallsms, both popular an1 traditional, which occur In the 
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heteroglot of the social strata. This indicates that what is common to 
the 'real' of the Reader Function is also common to that which 
constitutes reality within the text. As Baker states, '[r]eallstic detail is 
essential to magic realism, for, without the presence of a realistic 
framework, the story would become pure fantasy' ( 1991 :58). 
If we consider the extract from Carey's story with this in mind, 
we can see how the realist aspect of magic realism makes space for a 
detailed focus on the reality of the supermarket, on the 'great boxes 
all along the aisles', and the fantastic nature of the shadows within, 
not only as a commodity for people to consume, but also as a 
synecdochic enchantment of that which is 'normally' the co~ortable 
and unquestioned position of the Reader Function to the 'real'. This 
synecdochic enchantment creates a timespace where the thing, which, 
in the case cf Carey's story, is the product or 'shadow', ls necessarily 
foregrounded by the fact that it is capable of havtng a reality equal to 
our own, and can assume as many positions to the 'real' as our own. 
Patterson argues that 'the viewer, so llluminated, receives affirmation 
of an equal reality, sees and therefore is. Magic realist art, sometimes, 
shows us the world this way' (1986:29). 
Thus it is not just Uie notion of consumers consuming shadows 
that is re!lled by the synecdochic enchantment of the supermarket and 
its aisles of products, but also the knowledge that Reader Functions 
can themselves be consumed by the shadows in exactly the same 
circumstances. For is it not true that supermarkets, in the extra-
literary reality, are lined with a myriad of boxes which advertise their 
own appeal as commodity, and equally their own reality, above all 
else? In fact, the focus on shadows as an unquestionably acceptable 
commodity seems to indicate that the subgenre, while depicting the 
magic of the scenario, is not far removed from that which occurs in 
the 'real'. One might say that magic realism gets closer to the 'real' 
than realism w!thtn the context of narratology. 
While the above argument Identifies the base principle of Magic 
realism, there Is still some confusion within the subgenre that needs 
to be addressed. In particular, those concepts and practices which are 
often considered to be synonymic equivalents of magic realism, but 
which are, In fact, more accurately described as literary techniques or 
ntra-lfterary conditions which the subgenre can employ as subgeneric 
indicators, based on their appropriateness conditions, for its specific type 
of speech acts. Hancock identifies, for our purposes, the following 
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features which are central to an understanding of magic reallsm as 
subgenre: 'a labyrinthine awareness of other books: the use of fantasy 
to cast doubt on the nature of reallty: an absurd re-creation of 
"history"; a meta-fictional awareness of the process of fiction making: 
a reminder of the mysteriousness of the literary lmaglnatlon at work: 
a collective sense of folkloric past (1986:36). 
Primarily, the main terms which are equivalent to Hancock's list 
of features, and which I believe have been misunderstood not only as a 
synonymic equivalent for magic realism but as subgenres In 
themselves, are postmodernlsm, postcolonlallsm, fabulation, and 
metallctlonallty. It Is my contention that the first two are conditions 
specifically related to the extra-literary environment and Its 
narratologlcal apprehension by the subject-centred consciousness, 
and that the remaining two are techniques which an Author Function 
can use within a llterary reality by choice, but he or she does not 
necessarily need to do so In order for the narrative to be maglc-reallst. 
A discussion of subgenertc techniques almost always precedes 
the search for a subgenerlc definition. Although I am putting forth the 
proposition that Carey's short stories are magic-realist by the 
techniques discussed above, I must also address the notion that 
Carey's short stories could be mistakenly considered by some as 
products of subgenertc science fiction. This mistake has been made by 
Mellors, who categoriZes The Fat Man in HistonJ as 'a collection of scl-fi 
short stories first published ln Australia ln 1974' (1991:89). Rabkin 
states that 'a work belongs in the genre of science fiction if its 
narrative world is at least somewhat differeni from our own. and tf 
that difference is apparent against a background of an organized body 
of knowledge (1976:119). Turner argues that Carey falls under hls 
neologism of 'parafictlon' (1988:15) and Is therefore a 'user of science 
fiction, not a (sublgenre writer' (1988:21 ). And Van lkln states that, 
'Carey's subject matter ls similar to that which one would expect to 
find ln science fiction. But unllke the average science fiction writer, 
Carey does noi strive to prove the sclentlflc validity of hls 
extrapolations (1977:20. My Italics). 
If a work Is to be considered science fiction, It must valldate 
that which ls not koown on the basis of that which ls. In other words, 
the fantastic nature of the narrative must not only be valldated "1thln 
some existing body of knowledge, but must also be able to exist by the 
logical explanation of that body of knowledge. Although Carey Is not a 
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science fiction writer, but a user of the subgenre. It Is Important to 
bear this In mind because such a use forms the base principle of the 
lriferentheme. Besides an affiliation with the epistemological factor of 
science fiction, another reason for my formulating the concept of the 
lnjerentheme comes from two Interviews with Peter Carey. In both Van 
!kin (1977:31) and Attwood (1988:56), Carey speaks of developing 
themes and characters to progressive, logical extremes. That Is to say, 
the lnferentheme Is the progression of a narrative theme pushed to a 
logical extremity by the presence of accepted bodies of knowledge. 
The theme Itself Is not validated by those bodies of knowledge, 
but relfled In much the same manner as the base principle of 
synecdochic enchantment reifies the common ground between literary 
and extra-literary realities through an equal representatlun of realism 
and magic that exists In both. For the narrative theme Is still 
essentially served on a metaphoric platter to the Reader Function, but 
It Is garnished with that type of knowledge wtth which the Reader 
Function ts ··uniltar. and can therefore actept as the logical 
accompanir.Jcut which makes comfortable the progressive distance 
between him or her and the Inferential spatiality of the theme In 
question. The objective Is to make the theme mysteriously palatable. 
Examples of the lnferenthemc can be found In the following extracts 
from the 'Report on the Shadow Industry'. where the narrator states 
that: 
There are a few who say the smoke is dangerous because of 
carctnogcnlc chemicals used In U1c manufucture of shadows 
(1974:91). 
Others argue that the shadow Is a natural prnduct and by Its vcry 
nature ehemJcal1y pme (1974:92). 
Tile Bureau ofStat1stlcs reveals that the a\~ househokler spends 
25 per cent of his Income on these expensive g:xxts and Umt U!ls 
fCIOenlagetncreas<sasfuelnoomed...cn:ases(J974:92). 
1l1ere ls ... research to Indicate that fue high sutlle rate In advanced 
oounliif's Is connected with fue populartty of slmdows and that thele 
Is a direct statlstleal correlatiOn between shadow sales and surlde 
rates(l974:92). 
The above quotations Indicate that, while Carey does participate 
In scientific explanations of the perlocutlonary nature of the shadows, 
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he does not validate the fantastic nature of the shadows themselves. 
What we have. therefore, Is the ability for an Author Function to 
participate, by degree, In the techniques normally associated with 
science fiction through the lnferentheme's ability to rel(y the realism 
of the narrative while simultaneously leaving the central, thematic, 
element, the shadows, In a state of metaphoric play. If we consider the 
synecdochic enchantment of magic realism as subgenre. the mirroring 
of the extra-llt.,rary reality In the narrative occurs by the focus on 
specific and meticulous details which accompany the event. This, In 
turn, qualifies both the realism of a thing through the scientific 
explanation of Its effect, and the fantastic nature of the thing-In-Itself 
by the total acceptlblllly of Its Incomprehensible essentialism In both 
the literary and extra-literary environments. 
The tnferentheme. therefore. makes the mysterious mysteriously 
palatable, and organizes the metaphoric quality of the shadows 
against an acceptable body of knowledge. As Van !kin states, 'Carey 
establishes that the shadows are produced by a technological process, 
but he does not allow his acc0unt to become bogged in '""'~seudo~ 
technical Jargon' ( 1977:20). Magtc realism thereby allows the Author 
Function to get 'away with labyrinthine constructions by unifying the 
narrative with a voice that never q· ~sttons what tt [fantastically} tells' 
(Hancock, 1986:42). 
Since magic realism never questions the fantastic essentialism 
of its narrative, we must consider the notion of fabulation. Both 
Green { 1975} and Graernc Turner ( 19861 seem to sec Carey's short 
fiction as fabulation. While Green docs not cite a definition for the 
term. he does state that Carey's fiction has 'an autonomous "reality" 
which adds to our commonly perceived reality ( 1975:74.). I find this 
explanation of fabulation unsatisfactory simply because It seems to be 
an applicable possibility for all subgenrcs known to the Reader 
Function In the history of narrative. Turner, however, grounds his usc 
of the term In the definition of Robert Scholes by stating that 
'fabulation is defined, unhelpjully ... as "ethically controlled fantasy", 
revealing the contemporary 'plunge back into the tide of the story"' 
(1986:432. My italics). Both uses of the term fabulation, especially In 
Turner's case, are unhelpful simply because one cannot distinguish 
between technique or subgenre. Even Scholes himself, by the 
definition of 'ethically controlled fantasy' (1979:3), would seem to 
argue for fabulation as subgenre, and he does so by Invoking the Fable 
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as an example designed to illuminate that subgenerlc status. However, 
the mistake made In this definition of fabulation Is one that Is also 
quite common to fantasy and the fantastic, and can be simply 
rectified by an appropriate recourse to the base principles of the actual 
subgenres, namely Fable and Fantasy respectively. 
I have therefore proposed that fabulation Is a technique, and 
not a subgenre In Itself. In fact, when one considers It as a technique, 
the confusion surrounding the term Itself becomes less problematic 
and so renders the term more accessible. Scholes argues that 
' ... modern fabulation, like the ancient fabling of Aesop, tends away 
from direct representation of the surface of reality but returns toward 
actual human life by way of ethically controlled fantasy' (1979:3. My 
Italics). This Is the 'plunge back Into the tide of the story' (Scholes, 
1979:25)) that Turner ( 1986:432) considered so confusing as a 
subgenerlc definition. And Turner Is quite right to be confused simply 
because technique has been mistaken for subgenre. If we consider, for 
the moment, the relationship between Fable and fabulation, In 
comparison with Fantasy and the fantastic, then we can see that one 
Is axiomatically dependent upon the base principles of the subgenre. 
Indeed, what we consider to be fantastic ln magic realism, 
science fiction, or any subgenre for that matter, is dependent upon 
our knowledge, as Reader Functions, of the base principle of that 
subgenre called Fantasy. It Is my contention that fabulation works In 
more or less the same manner by its axiomatic dependency on the 
subgenerlc Fable and the art of fabling. In that sense, then, It Is a 
technique that exlstsjor the Author Function's use by a dialogic link to the 
base principle of the subgenerlc Fable, and In this manner can the Author 
Function ground the narrative, by the value question inherent In all ethical 
deliberations, firmly within the extra-literary environment qf the Reader 
Function. Magic realism, when It uses the fabulist technique, makes Its 
connections between literary and extra-literary environments a 
definitive process of consideration, and can thereby force the Reader 
Function to consider the ethics of the inferentheme. 
Let us consider an extract from 'Report on the Shadow 
Industry': 
My own lather left home because of somethlng he had seen In a ba>< 
of shadows. It wasn't an expensive OOx, either, qUite the opposite -a 
l1ttle swprtse my mother had bought with the money left <Ner from 
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her housekeq:mg. He opened it after dinner one Frt:lay night and he 
was gone beilre I came down to l:realmst on the Satwday. He lelt a 
note wbk:h my mother onlY sh<Mffi me ""Y recently. My father was 
not g:lOd With words and had tmuble oommunlcatlng what he had 
seen: 'Words cannot EJqress It What I Feel Because of The Things I 
Sawin The BaxOfShadowsYou Bought Me." (1974:93). 
While In the preVIous extract we discussed the science fictional 
validation of the shadows' perlocutlonary effects, It Is here that we 
enter another realm of the shadows' perlocutlon, through !he fabulist 
technique, In both the literary and extra-literary reality. That Is to say, 
the value of a shadow, as an lnferentheme, Is questioned by the fact 
that Its effect on IndiViduals, who both encounter and use them as a 
commod.!ty, tends to fragment what was preVIously considered to be a 
stable element of the 'real'. Indeed, the shadows' abilities to Implicate 
the IndiVIdual In some sort of metaphysical struggle between good and 
evil, between known and unknown, and between hopes and fears 
Indicate an educative quality and dialogic llnk to the classic 
moralisms and Ulocuttonary force of Fables. For fabulation, this 
Indicates the technique's ability to orchestrate the performance of Its 
speech acts with the atm of achieVIng a specified ethical closure ln the 
production and transference of meaning. 
It ls this potential of the fabullsl technique, wllhln u.aglc 
realism, that has led critics like Bliss ( 1991 ). Mellors ( 1991 ), and Sage 
(1995). as Reader Functions, lo approach Carey with the possibility, 
as well as the Intention, of producing morallsl readings of his 
narratives. And lt ls the fabullst teclmlque, ln magic realism, that 
creates a space for Carey, as Author Function, to inject his narratives 
wlth a moral flavour that ls 'moulded out of the Christian mode' 
(Sibree, 1991:5). As Carey has stated In an Interview with Tausky, 
'even though I am not a Christian, there are many things about 
Christianity which are attractive' (1990:34). 
There ls another dimension to fabulation of which Scholes 
makes us aware, and whtch we must discuss here. Scholes states that 
'In the present volume !Fabulation and Met<YJct!on], I have tried to 
attend more thoroughly to the experimental or metajlcttonaldlmenslon 
Q{modernfabulatton' (1979:4). With metafictlonallty defined as 'fiction 
about fiction' (Turner, 1986:432). It would seem that, for Scholes, 
fabulation Is a subgenre where the Author Function can participate In 
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that dimension of modern narrative called metaflctlonallty. 
However, as I have already argued, fabulation Is approprtately 
classlfled as a technique. We can, therefore, perform the following 
move. Because Scholes classifles metaftctionallty as a dimension, we 
can take It one step further and propose that metaflctlonallty Is " 
technique based upon the reflexivity that Is 'present In all texts and 
central to all literary analysts; a function which, by analysing literary 
processes, enables us to understand the processes by which we read 
the world as text' (Ommundsen, 1993:4). The reason we may call it a 
technique, or function, or even a dimension, is simply because 
metaflctlonallty Is an Inherent property of all texts and all 
narrataloglcal processes. But because It can be deliberately emplvyed 
by the Author Function as a narrative stratagem, It Is a technique 
that overtly determines the direction In which the Reader Function 
reads the Intentionality of sense and reference within the context of a 
production and transference of meaning from text to Reader Function. 
Ommundsen warns, however, that 'if we restrict the category 
'reflexive fiction' to texts that are overt or explicit In their reflexive 
commentary, and the adjective 'reflexive' to statements about wrttlng 
and art only, we Impose scrtous limitations, not only on 'reflexivity' as 
such. but also on the fictional text's potential for meaning' (1993: 18). 
Nevertheless, metaflctlonallty Is a dimension common to all 
subgencrlc texts, and generic media. But within a text that docs not 
overtly employ the metaflctlonal technique, or does not overtly 
foreground Its metaflctlonal status, the Reader Function can only 
consider the text's metaflctlonallty If he or she has the theoretical 
competence to do so. Otherwise, the text's metaflctlonal status wlll go 
totally unnoticed. In the text which overtly plays with Its 
metaflctlonallty, such metaflctlonality Is foregrounded by the Author 
Function's Intentional Injecting of the metaflctional technique within 
whatever subgenertc styllstlcs he or she Is wrttlng. 
Consider the following from 'Report on the Shadow Industry' 
within the context of metaftctlonality: 
My own teelings a!:out the shadows are amltvalent, to say the least 
For here I have manufactured one more: elusive, unsatlsfactory, 
htotlng at greater beauties and more profound nzysterles that exist 
somewhere before the beglnnlng and somewhere after the end 
(1974:94). 
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Ommundsen argues that a metaflctlonal text 'may refuse to 
comply with expectations set up by the (sub]genre to which It belongs' 
(1993:9). In the case of Carey and magic realism In the above, the 
metaflctlonal!ty complies exactly with the base principle of the 
subgenre, one In whtch both synecdochic enchantment and the 
ground rules set up by the narrative are reversed at some point during 
the narrative. As Rabkin states, '(e]very work of art sets up Its own 
ground rules. The perspectives that the fantastic contradicts are 
perspectives legitimized by those Internal ground rules (1976:4-5). I 
will discuss Rabkin's notion further In Chapter Two when we explore 
Carey's 'Peeling'. 
In the case of 'Report on Shadow Industry' and the 
inferentheme, such a reversal occurs in the above extract when the 
narrator logically transgresses from reporter of the shadows as 
commodity to the metaphysical status of manufacturer of shadows. 
And on the metaflctlonal level of the narrative as written signatures, 
the narrator transgresses from being a Reader Function of those 
signatures, the shadows, to an Author Function of their production In 
much the same way as the shift that occurs from Reader Function to 
Author Function when we write our 'reports' of the narrative. Thus the 
metaflctlonal technique, In thts Instance, allows the Author Function 
to Invoke the appropriateness conditions necessary for the reversal to 
occur. And If we consider the fabulist technique within this con text, 
the narrative of 'Report on the Shadow Industry' becomes a magic 
realist speech act which demands that we, as Reader Function, 
consider the ethical value of such a manufactured product. Hancock 
(1986:47) states that magic realism does nothing stmp:er than produce 
an alternative to the question of reality, asking readers not to 
consider what Is before them but what It Is they want before them. 
One may begin to wonder why all the Information relayed 1n the 
above argument ts not simply considered as a mtnute breakdown of 
that whtch charactertzes the postcolonial and postmodem narrative, 
rather than that of magtc realism. It ts a rather dlfflcult dtstlnctton to 
make If one persists In categortztng every styllsttc execution occurring 
tn narrative as a subgenre tn and of Itself. Within the context of 
postmodemlsm, Hawthorne states that '(t(wo relateci terms describing 
postmodern!st fiction are fabulation and surflctton. Both terms Imply 
an aggressive and playful luxurlatlon In the non-representational, In 
whtch the writer takes delight In the artifice of wrtting rather than In 
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using writing to describe or make contact with a perceived extra· 
fictional reality' (1992:111). For Hawthorne, the subgenre Is 
postmoderntsm, and Its synonymic descriptions are fabulation and 
surflctlon. Indeed, with fabulation, Hawthorne Is quite adamant that 
It helps to solidify that break with an extra-fictional reality which Is 
the hallmark of postmodernlsm. This Is, of course, plainly false. If 
fabulation Is ethically controlled, can It not but make contact with 
some aspect of an extra-fictional reality? 
One can begin to see the distance between what Is 
postmodernlst, and what Is magic realist. Indeed, the distance 
between postmodernlsm and magic realism Is such that they rarely 
meet In the boundaries of a critical discourse, and when they do, there 
tends to be more confusion than understanding. The problem Is one 
that 3tems primarily from a categorical misappropriation, by the 
critics, of postmodernlsm as both condition and subgenre, rather than 
as a condition alone. I do not de~~Y iiiat postmodernism can filter 
through, or be Invoked Intentionally, within a narrative structure, but 
It tends to lend Itself to a variety of subgenres rather than one of Its 
own making. While Lyotard (1992:124) will argue that the postmodern 
writer does not work with any singular base principle, and cannot be 
read, therefore, with a definitive set of rules In mind, his argument Is 
based on the hidden assumption that postmodernlsm does not 
function as a subgenre, and has no inherent intention of being 
constructed as one because it rejects the singular and organizing 
operativeness of a base principle. This is, of course, far removed from 
the subgenre of magic realism, because it does have an organizing 
base principle of synecdochic enchantment, which stipulates and 
regulates the primary direction of the narrative and Its speech acts. 
Easthope and McGowan state that 'while the forms of ('aStiche, 
self-referential and explicitly lntertextual "style" of postmodernism 
owes something to the mode of modernism, they do, none the less, 
also break with the referent of the real (history, time, art and the 
artist) which modernism maintained' (1992:182). Once again It Is 
apparent that postmodernlsm breaks with that which appropriates 
subgenerlc distinctions by severing Itself from a limiting base 
principle, and so lends Itself readily to the potential of the pastiche of 
base principles, ultimately denying essential!stic truth and value to a 
single thing or process. Waugh (1992:3) states that postmodernlsm Is 
a condition as well as a mood, characterized by the sense of an ending, 
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that has transgressed from the boundaries of the aesthetic and art 
into those traditionally believed to be stable areas of reality, namely 
science, cognition, and morality. As Hutcheon (1988) argues, 
postmodemism Is a condition where the aesthetics of modernism 
leaves the boundaries of the text behind and transgresses uncertatnty 
Into all that which we had assumed was a stable, knowledgeable 
reality. 
All In all, despite the fact that both the subgenre of magic 
realism and the postmodern condition may tend to exist by the same 
techniques, the sense of an ending and the textual affinity to an 
exira-literary reality are Important distinctions between magic realism 
and postmodernlsm. The magic realist subgenre may Invoke the 
postmodern condition but It does not wholly and exclusively 
participate In the apocalyptic elimination of both literary and extra· 
literary realities. To illustrate this further within speech act 
principles, magic realism operates and organizes Itself specifically 
within the performativlty of !llocutlonary force and closure, while the 
postmodern condition cannot but exts t by the self-performativlty of 
the grapheme, shifting the signatures from context to context. 
To return to the extract from 'Report on the Shadow Industry', 
the narrator, stating he has manufactured one more shadow, the 
narrative of the report Itself. says that It hints 'at greater beauties and 
more profound mysteries that exist somewhere before the beginning 
and somewhere after the end' I 1974:94). If this were read within a 
postmodern perspective, the greater beauties could very well l.Je 
existence of the signatures, as pastiche, in the endless and open 
perforrnatlvlty of a multiplicity of contexts. In magic realism. however. 
Carey Is able to hint at possible realities which exist In a 
metaphysically transcendent state to the Reader Function's notion of 
time and space. This state is a type of reality which has an equal 
truth and and equal value, In a closed context, to that reality which Is 
commonly perceived as 'the real'. And once again, It Is the 
metaflctlonal technique, In conjunction with the lnferentheme, that 
qualifies this 'closed' sense and reference. For the story has both a 
thematic beginning and a thematic end which In themselves 
constitute a logically progressive reality by the ground rules of the 
subgenre, based on accepted bodies of knowledge In the social 
heteroglot, where the extra-literary reality of the Reader Function 
exists both before and after the narrative has ended. The point being 
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made by such a structural alignment between literary and extra-
literary realities Is !hat beyond the extra-literary reality we know may 
lie several other possible realities, as yet uncharted, which have 
structural affinities of some kind to our own, and so may hint at 
greater beauties and more profound mysteries not only In some 
transcendent state, but also, and more Importantly, In our own. 
0,1e methodology of Interpreting this multiplicity of realities, 
waiting to be charted and Invented (or reinvented), Is the postcolonial 
condition of both the literary and extra-literary realities. Much magic 
realist writings have been, at some point or another, consldored 
wholly from the postcolonial perspective. And we may further state 
that, at Urnes, the distinction between p~~tcolonlality and magic 
realism Is difficult to make. However, what Is needed In order to make 
such a distinction Is exactly that which 1 have been arguing within 
the context of postmodernlsm, and that Is the distinction between 
cultural condition and subgenertc representation. Postcolonlallty Is a 
condition In the extra-literary reality which proceeds to reinvent, or 
bring to the forefront, those cultural realities which have been 
marginalized by the persistent manufacturing of truth from one 
dominant, empirical, culture. Ashcroft et a! (1989:2) argue that the 
use of the term postcolonial is based on the notion that a multiplicity 
of cultural realities In the world has been dismantled by the l!:uropean 
aggression of imperial processes. And Adam art;ues that the 
postcolonial Is a practice that gains Its Impetus from ·social and 
political self assertlon'(l991:79). 
As a practice, It Is the ability of individual writers to Illuminate 
their condition of cultural marginalization primarily by narrative, and, 
In this manner, can the condition Infiltrate the chosen subgenre of 
the Author Function. The fact that an Author Function c"n take 
magic realism as the subgenre of choice does not at all Imply that 
magic realism Is always driven by a primary concern for postcolonial 
Issues. An example of this Is some of the short fiction of Jorge Luis 
Borges. Although the content of his short fiction does make 
undeniable political statements about the nature of reality, It does 
not necessarily always consider Itself with the question of Imperial 
aggression and marginalization. As we can see In 'Report on the 
Shadow Industry', a variety of techniques make their way Into the 
Intentions and words of the Author Function but none of them overtly 
Implies postcolonial politics as we have discussed In the above 
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argument. 
Indeed, the Issue of possible realities, borrowed from the 
principles of what Is generally considered to be postcolonlallty, In 
'Report on the Shadow Industry', Is an Issue not of marginalization 
but of potentially greater understanding In the metaphysics of being If 
and when we chart the uncharted. In some sense, one could argue 
that this Interpretation of the story reaffirms the question of 
Imperialism Into the unknown, but this would only be so If such an 
undertaking refused to deliberate upon the question of equal realities 
and their value Inherent In all things that pass through our own 
'rear. We must chart the uncharted by the base principle of magic 
realism, by synecdochic enchantment, In order for the nature of reality 
to achieve a broader scope of truth. The point to be made here Is that 
not all magic realist narratives are postcolonial. While they may 
Include the principles of the postcolonial condition, It Is not necessary 
for them to be artefacts of postcolontallty In order for them to be 
examples of magic realism. 
What does all this Imply for the magic realist su bgenre? Except 
for Its base principle, they are all sufficient conditions for the speech 
acts of a narrative to be classified as conditions appropriate to the 
magic realist subgenre. Pratt (1977:204) states that readers expect and 
Isolate the appropriateness conditions of a su bgenre In order to begin 
their analysis of the speech act In question, decoding the text 
according to Its directives, or Indicators. This has been the 
fundamental principle of this chapter. Thomas reasons that the 
sufficient condition 'for some situation is any circumstance or 
condition whose existence or fulfillment, by itself, is enough to bring 
about or guarantee tbe existence of that situation' (1986: 193). And, as 
such, these techniques and conditions function as subgenerlc 
Indicators when they are deployed within the narrative stratagem. 
For example, both fabulation and metaflctlonality as magic 
realist techniques based on appropriateness conditions, and the 
postmodern and postcolonial extra.literary conditions or moods, 
reconstitute themselves within the larger structure, upon deployment 
In the narrative stratagem, as su bgenerlc Indicators with a relative 
Ulocutionary force. That Is to say, every one of the aforementioned 
techniques and conditions are enough, by themselves, to bring about 
the state or existence of a magic realist speech act, but they do not 
necessarily Imply that such an act has occurred. What this means Is 
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that the aforementioned techniques and conditions lend themselves 
readily to any subgenre and must be analysed according to the base 
principle and ground rule regulations of that subgenre. As Thomas 
argues. 'when a statement of sufficient conditions Is made. It Is very 
Important that Its context be clearly stated or understood' (1986:194). 
Within the context of magic realism, the base principle Is quite 
simply one that foregrounds a relftcatton of realism by an attention to 
meticulous detail In order for the progression of synecdochic 
enchantment In that realism to occur. This progression allows the 
Author Function to deploy the fantastic In a reversal of the narrative 
ground rules on the basis of the sufficient ccndltion of the 
lnferentheme. And the ground rule Is whatever Is thematically laid 
down by the narrative, hence the lnferentheme, In either the monoglot 
or heteroglot poles of literary and extra-literary acts. In this sense, 
then, the base principle of a subgenre Is Its necessary condition. 
Thomas states that a necessary condition 'for some situation Is any 
circumstance or condition that needs to be fulfilled In order for that 
situation to exist' (1986:194). Magic reallsm, therefore, cannot be 
'magic realism' unless its necessary condition, its base principle of 
synecdochic enchantment, Is considered as the logtcal necessity for Its 
existence, and is considered as the organizing factor by wl:lch all 
sufficient conditions, or appropriateness conditions, contribute to the 
formulation of the larger structure of the su bgenre by their 
reconstitution as subgenertc indicators with lllocutlonary forces. 
Thus the narrator ln 'Report on the Shadow Industry', by the 
reconstitution of the previously llsted appropriateness conditions In 
the larger structure of the magic realist subgenre, becomes a producer 
of shadows rather than a reporter of Its consumption, and the logical 
progression towards the reversal of this ground rule has occurred 
through the subgenertc Indicators and their lllocutionary forces In the 
subgenre. The magic realist speech act Is happily executed. 
And by such an execution we cannot but analyse the act within 
the context of the performatlvity of an Ulocution unless we were to 
ignore the two following important points. Firstly, since magic realism 
partakes In the overt presence of a narrative organized around the 
clo~1e-knit intricacy of a sjuzhet, its closure of sense and reference, and 
Its transference of meaning occurs primarily by its abillty to ride the 
Scholean 'tide of the story'. Indeed, as Dovey ( 1983:202) has stated, 
the very presence of a sjuzhet In Carey's stories determines the need for 
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an analysis of Indicators by the direction of the narrative's formal 
structure as well as Its logically conclusive, but contradictory, endtng. 
And secondly, when we consider the breakdown of Austin's (1971) 
classic constatlve-performatlve distinction as a prtnclple that can lend 
Itself to subgeneric tndlcators, we ftnd that no subgenerlc Indicators 
are 'constatlve', and so none Is either true or false within the context 
of their usage as an appropriateness condition for the magic realist 
speech act. 
All Indicators are performatlve, and so depend upon 
appropriateness conditions for their successful, or felicitous, 
performance as an act of a particular subgenre In question. For they 
can readily lend themselves to the variform genres and su bgenres tn 
both the monoglot and heteroglot poles. What Is fixed, however, for 
the subgenre, Is the base principle because of Its status as necessary 
condition, and because It organizes the appropriateness conditions as 
subgenertc Indicators, with lllocutlonary force, to formulate the larger 
structure of the subgenre Itself. It Is this factor of the magic realist 
subgenre, In combination with both Rabkin's and Todorov's theories 
of the fantastic, as sufficient condition, that I will discuss in the next 
chapter. 
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I!!!!;. The Fantastic Indicator: 'Peeling'. 
We ended the first chapter on the note that our approprtateness 
conditions are In fact synonomous, because of their perfonnative 
nature, with their functiontng as subgenertc Indicators. Let us discuss 
this In more detail. The approprtateness conditions, or subgenerlc 
Indicators, most common to the magic reallst subgenre are the literary 
conditions of fabulation, metaftctional!ty and the lnferentheme, and 
the extra-literary conditions of poslmodernlsm, and postcolonlallsm. 
Although this list will make do for the moment, there Is nothing to 
stop the Reader Function from postulating another approprtateness 
condition If such a condition helps to Illuminate the functioning of 
the contextual margins through Its status as a subgenerlc Indicator. 
As Derrlda states, 'a context Is never absolutely determinable 
[and] Its determination can never be entirely certain or saturated' 
(Sec, 1979:174). Put simply, no context Is able to be wholly determined 
by what Is known about It, and no context Is so full as to be unable to 
take on more than that which It already has within. The possibility of 
expansion and addition within subgenres will always exist because the 
appropriateness conditions are not contextually llnlte In themselves. 
This Is, In fact, what we will be consldertng In this chapter when we 
discuss the fantastic as another appropriateness condition and 
subgenertc Indicator within the magic realist subgenre. 
Petzold (1986) argues that each and every narrative should be 
considered as a discursive mixture of both the realistic and the 
fantastic. If we remember Kenyon's statement, the notion of this 
'discursive mixture' is important to our argument. We remember that 
there are no true centres to these concepts. and the ones we confront 
are the ones we have posited as centre. Indeed, because subgeneric 
Indicators are logically sufficient, their corre"pondtng appropriateness 
condition can lend Itself readily to other subgenres. The subgenres 
themselves, therefore, can be seen as a 'mixture', or compilation of 
subgenerlc Indicators, based on the marglnallsm of their 
corresponding appropriateness conditions, where each Indicator, with 
Its own Ulocutlonary force, works toward the greater perlocutlonary 
effect. The subgenre should not be seen as an essentially totalistic 
body which Is never Impregnated with a foreign, subgenertc element. 
With this In mind, It must be stated that the necessary 
condition, or base principle of magic realism, synecdochic 
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enchantment, llke any other base prtnclple, Is not a subgenerlc centre 
even though It may seem to function as one. It Is an organizing 
principle by which all appropriateness conditions operating within the 
subgenre have their graphematlc forces harnessed, as subgeneric 
Indicators, so that a greater, 'lllocuttonary' order Is posited on to an 
always existing and microcosmic chaos. Wilson states that 'it]here 
seems to be no single, free-standing, uncontaminated, pure text -only 
the weaves and nets, the threads and the labyrinths of textuallty. 
Stmllarly, there seems to be no pure, single-formed space In literature 
(1986:73). He proceeds to argue that the category of magic realism Is a 
plurality of worlds that 'always approach each other but never actually 
merge· (1986"13). 
By replacing 'worlds' with appropriateness conditions which, In 
turn. originate from a plurality of contexts, Wilson's point Is rather 
stmllar to our own, except for the notion that these 'worlds', or 
appropriateness conditions, never actually merge. Indeed, on the level 
of the subgenertc Indicator, they do appear to merge and actually 
sustain an order by their being harnessed to the organizing Influence 
of the base ptinclple. An organizing factor allows for the creation of a 
larger structure by the Intentionality of the Author Function. But It Is 
right to consider that such a merger Is not a once only event, and that 
the larger subgeneric structure Is not an Isolated entity because It has 
harnessed those ·graphematlc' forces of the appropriateness conditions 
on the microcosmic level. 
In this sense, then, the appropriateness condition functions 
somewhat similarly to the grapheme that precedes the locution. It can 
shift and play like the grapheme, executing a variety of semantic 
forces that can be harnessed by the base principle of a subgenre In 
order to consltute the appropriateness condition as a subgenerlc 
Indicator. As a subgeneric Indicator, the appropriateness condition 
exists on a level similar to that of the locution. In Its more 
graphemat.lc state, It Is nothing more than an lterabie mark In a 
multiplicity of subgeneric contexts. An appropriateness condiUon does 
not exist In a singular and all-encompassing context, and so Its status as 
subgenertc Indicator Is thereby always su.fficlent within one context. 
Derrlda states that '(o)ne can perhaps come to recognise other 
possibilities In It by Inscribing It or grafting It onto other chains. No 
context can entirely close it. Nor can any code, the code here being 
both the possibility and Impossibility of writing, of Its essential 
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lterab!Uty (repetition/ alterlty)' (Sec, 1979: 182). 
And, even though we are dealing with one structure, namely 
magic realism, It Is the base principle of that subgenre, the meticulous 
attention to detail, which Indicates to us that Its context Is not an 
Isolated occurrence but a compilation of all those contexts In which It 
has engaged. Such meticulous attention to detail, or synecdochic 
enchantment, indicates that appropriateness conditions can not only 
shift In a multlpllclty of contexts, but can equally take with them the 
contexts In which they have played while they ful1llled a marginal role 
within another larger structure. Thus the lnferentheme, for example, 
not only has a contextual affiliation with the subgenre from which It 
borrows Its principles, namely science fiction, It can also extend those 
contextual principles, within Its status as an appropriateness 
condition, to other subgenres, lending ltse!freadUy, and altering bodies 
of knowledge to logical extremes by Its ability to repeat, In principle, 
that which It has done In a previous context, In a previous larger 
structure. 
Bakhtln states that '[t[he word lives, as It we1e, on the 
boundar:• between its own context and another, allen, context' 
(1981 :284). This Bakhtlnlan principle has equal weight In our 
discussion by the fact that the magic realist speech ar:t Illuminates 
that which Is common to all speech acts because It Is the sum total of 
Its own philosophical position In both genre theory and speech act 
theory. It Is what Austin ( 1962) am: Searle (1970) classed as the 
'parasite', not only because of its status as fictional, or non-serious 
discourse, but because It Itself Indulges In parasitism. Thus the 
felicity of a speech act's performance tn magic realism, In order for It 
to be magic realism, Is not just simply a centripetal process. If we 
consider, as an example from 'Peeling·, Nile's declaration that she Is 
'soaked ... to the marrow of my bones' with 'antiseptic', and that 'It has 
come to upset me' (1974:29), we can see that the lllocutlon of her act 
Is grounded In a parasitic performance and not tn some centripetal 
process towards an Idealized performatlve. Indeed. the Implication of 
the word antlsepUc Is such that, In this context, the declaratory force 
of the act allows the allen context to become a part cf Nile while 
simultaneously projecting her being Into a multiplicity of parasitic 
contexts, all with disastrous perlocutlonary consequences for the 
narrator's Intentions, and thus eradicating the notion of her ab!Uty to 
speak and exist In performative essences. 
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And, If we further consider this status quo wh uln the context of 
the narrator of 'Peeling', we find a rather surprisingly stmllar set of 
circumstances. Within a relatively short amount of time, the Reader 
Function Is made aware of the narrator's position towards the colour 
whtte. Whtle 'white hair' Is his 'one dlstlnctton' (1974:22), the narrator 
states that 'I loathe white' (1974:23). Indeed, the colour white Is 
Initially given a rudimentary place In the performatlve essences of the 
narrator's existence, alongside all the other essentlallistlc 
performatives he knows about himself. But, because he desires to be 
gratified by an equally Idealized and essentialltstic performative which 
classifies Nile, the one distinction that marks him Is thrown Into a 
multiplicity of parasitic performant•.,s. Because It Is not centripetal, 
the colour white plays from cont< <t to context, from Nile's white 
bedroom to her white bedspread, from her white dolls to her white 
throat, and from 'her fears about the souls of aborted babies' 
(1974:28) to the narrator's feeling that he 'may drown In a mlllton 
gallons of milk' (1974:31). 
While the colour white 1tself 'has no appeal to [Nile[, It Is simply 
that It says nothing, being less dramatic than black', It foregrounds 
the narrator's continually frustrated efforts. throughout the narrative 
performances, to get at her 'true colour', or to find something that 
equates to his preference for '[s]omethtng a little more feminine. 
Something wlth ... more character about It' (1974:23). For the narrator, 
this something Is a 'pretty blue' (1974:23) and could be the difference 
in her character to the colour white, which he believes Is one of his 
disttngutshtng, centripetal features. or one of his essences. However, 
Nile's predominant colour Is one that falls Into the multiplicity of 
contexts, not only making her speech performances and her existence 
a parasitic product, but also confronting the narrator with the ever-
existing threat that his own esscnttaltsms are nothing more than an 
Illusion tn the parasitism of the colour white. 
As we can see, an lllocuttonary performance does not 
deductively appropriate to Itself that which Is Its essence In some 
Idealized state, as Searle ( 1970:55; !979:204-5) wanted to do when he 
spoke of excluding marginal cases. and Austin tried to do during the 
course of How To Do Thtngs With Words but could not because the 
purity of performatlves 'gave trouble from the start .... (and( has to be 
abandoned In favour of more general jamUies of related and 
overlapping speech-acts' (1962: 150). 
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It Is by this notion of 'general famtlles' of acts In which Derrlda 
states that the system 'I call graphematic In general...consequently 
biurs ... all the oppositions which follow, oppositions whose pertinence, 
purity, and rigor Austin [and, later, Searle] has unsuccessfully 
attempted to establish' (Sec,l979:187). The felicity of the magtc realist 
speech act lies In Its margine .. In Its 'Infelicities', In tts ability to 
eradicate distinctions and Incorporate the appropriateness conditions 
which belong to the extended families of subgenres and speech acts 
Into Its own 'context', while overtly pointing out that they equally play 
In the contexts of the other. The key ts to isolate the thematic role 
played by the base principle In allowing the Author Function to 
harness the 111ocutlonary forces of subgenertc Indicators that are 
found In the appropriateness conditions. This culmination of 
harnessed forces can thus result !n a type of subgenertc closure. Let 
us consider 'Peeling'; 
And she walks above my head. probab1Y arrangtng the little white 
dolls which she will not explaln and which I never ask about, 
knowtng she will not explain, and not lOr the moment wishing an 
expanatlon. She buys the dolls from the Portobello Rood. the north 
end, on Friday mo~ and at another market on Thursdays, she 
has not rew.al<d where, but leaves early. at about 5 AM. I know It Is a 
market she gpes to, hut I don't which one. 1he dolls an.<ve In all 
conditions, cranuned Into a large carrlboard sull£ase which she takes 
out on her expeditions. Those wh!ch still have hair she plucks I:Eid, 
and those with eyes lose them, and those with teeth have them 
rem<>.OO and she paln1s them. slowly, white. She uses a Jlat plastic 
JE!nt I have seen the tinS (1974:22). 
True to the base principle of 1nagtc realism, much meticulous 
detail Is gtven tn the opening paragraphs of the short story. Indeed, as 
I have discussed in chapter one, synecdochic enchantment tends to 
allow for a rich focus on detaJiln order for that magic to occur and be 
explotted by the su bgenerlc Indicators functioning Within the larger 
structure of the subgenre. Although It Is possible to delve Into an 
analysts of such meticulous detail and produce a specific type of 
reading. 11 Will sufllce here to slate, as I already have, that the base 
principle exercises an organizing force which styllstically orchestrates 
the lltenuy environment to the lntentionallty of the Author Function. 
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For our purposes, we wtll focus In this chapter on the synecdochic 
enchantment of the dolls because It Is that which the approprtateness 
conditions, as subgenerlc indicators, adhere to the most, and thereby 
generate a specifically tight relationship between the dolls and Nile. 
And It Is this relationship which Is taken to a logical extreme tn 
the sexual encounter between Nile and the narrator. Thus the 
!nferentheme and the ground rule reversal have particularly strong 
Influences here by their ability to adhere to the meticulous deta!l 
given In the above extract, especially that which communicates the 
state of the dolls. It will help, therefore, to remember their whiteness, 
thetr baldness, and thetr featureless state of existence as an organized 
product, through Author Function Intentionality and base principle, 
which has a direct consequence In the sjuzhet of the narrative. 
This leads us to the notion of the fantastic In magic realism. As 
I have stated In chapter one, the fantastic Is also a sufficient 
condition because, as appropriateness condition, It can lend Itself 
readily to other subgenres, and can thereby modi!'y Its Ulocutlonary 
force as su bgenertc indicator in conjunction wtth the requirements of 
the base principle In question. Within the context of magic realism, 
the fantastic Indicator, like any other subgenerlc Indicator, merges 
with the meticulous detail In the narrative so that Its perlocutlonary 
effect may occur. This is the logical outcome of the harnessing of the 
fantastic as an appropriateness condition by the base principle of 
synecdochic enchantment. But what, then, characterizes the 
fantastic? 
Rabkin states that 'the fantastic has a place In any narrative 
(sub(genre, but that (sub]genre to which the fantastic Is exhaustively 
central Is the class of narrative.s we call Fantasy' ( 1976:29). Despite 
our refutation of centrality, R?.'okin Is quite rtght In pointing out that 
the fantastic, as appropriateness condition and subgeneric Indicator, 
is axiomatically dependent upon the base principle of that subgenre 
we call Fantasy. Indeed, we have mentioned before In our argument, In 
chapter one, when we spoke of a similar set of circumstances with the 
axiomatic dependency of fabulation to the subgeneric Fable. And we 
have men tloned In this chapter repeatedly that ali appropriateness 
conditions lend themselves readily to other contexts, other subgenres, 
and can thereby constitute themselves differently In accord,mce wtth 
the base principles of those larger structures. 
Since the fantastic adheres, In magic realism, to the meticulous 
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detail laid out by the base principle of synecdochic enchantment, It 
forces a ground rule reversal of the subgenre's necessary condition to 
occur. Rabkin argues that 'In most narratives, no matter where they 
fall along the scale of the fantastic, the ground rules of the narrative 
world accommodate paired opposites. In a Fantasy, the opposition Is 
at the level of the ground rules themselves. In this, Fantasy Is unique' 
(1976:38). 
With magic realism, a ground rule reversal Is both thematic, 
worklog tn conjunction with the tnferentheme, and on the level of the 
structure Itself. Rabkin's 'paired opposites' Indicate that a reversal is 
somewhat similar to the hierarchal aggression that occurs In a binary 
opposition. And stnce appropriateness conditions cannot be enclosed 
by a single context, functioning rather In a multiplicity of contexts, It 
Is always possible that a paradigm shift from su bgenre to subgenre, 
context to context, takes with It the probabillty of reversal found In 
the trace of the other. Thus we return to the axiomatic dependency of 
the fantastic on Fantasy. In Fantasy, according to Rabkin, the ground 
rule reversal Is at the level of the ground rules Itself. In our words, the 
base principle of Fantasy is a continual 360 degree reversal of the 
ground rules at particular chronotopic points in the narrative. In 
layman's terms, Fantasy continually reverses tts own narratorial 
propositions, and Rabkin ( 1976) himself validates this with the 
example of Through the Looking Glass, where the ground rules of the 
literary environment and the extra-literary environment are 
continually reversed, or contradicted, as the seemingly impossible 
becomes possible. 
For us however. it is fair only to state that the fantastic, as 
appropriateness condition, has an axtomatic dependency on this base 
principle of Fantasy. Unlike Fantasy, magic realism does not make !he 
Impossible possible, It makes the possible extremely possible because 
that which Is known, or that which Is made clear by the base principle 
and the ground rules of the narrative, Is taken to Its logical extreme 
by the tnferentheme. Thus for our purposes, the fantastic (Rabkin, 
1976: 12) Is characterized by a 180 degree reversal of the ground rules In 
accordance with the necessary demand of the base principle. In this 
sense, then, we have what Derrida would term as a 'non-present 
remainder [orJ a differential mark cut off from Its putative 'production' 
or origin' (Limited Inc. , 1979: 190). It Is exactly like the Derrtdean 'trace' 
and Is 'neither present nor absent' (/..lmlted Inc., 1979: 190). What this 
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means Is that an axiomatic dependency Is based on both the 
presupposed o!igln of a context for an appropliateness condition and 
the absence of such an origin because It falls Into the multiplicity of 
contexts, whereby the o!igln Itself Is perhaps also the product of such 
multiplicity. 
Thus Fantasy as a subgenre can Itself be characterized as a 
product of contextual multiplicity on the graphematlc level, and Its 
base plinolple Is a necessary condition of our ablllty to explore It as a 
product of stylistic difference In the larger structure. Consider the 
folloWing description of Nile by the narrator; 
She Ls, how to can It, artlstlc. She wears clothes of an onllnaly person, 
of a great number of quite dlfierent onllnaly P'fSOllS, but she ammges 
them In the manner of those who are caRed artLstlc. Small pieceS are 
tacked together With a confidence that contradicts her manner and 
amazes me. Pieces of tiny artlllc:lalll<mers, a pm of a butchet's apron, 
okl Portugese shoes, a sliver pendan~ medal rtbbons, a hand-(Elnted 
stole, and a hundred milk botlle tops made unreoognlzable. She Ls like 
a magpie With a movable nest ( 1974:25-26). 
Of all the performances that constitute Nile as a speaker In a 
magic reaUst context, she is tc some degree a product of subgeneric 
Fantasy because of the lllocutlonary force of the fantastic Indicator. 
Indeed, the figure described In the above passage seems to be both an 
image of singular, objecified artfulness as well as that which can 
readily slip out of her own artfully unified, larger structure Into the 
multiplicity that characterizes her by way of a ground rule reversal. 
Hypothetically speaking, lf this figure of Nile appeared In a subgenerlc 
Fantasy, and not, as It does, In magtc realism, then the multiplicity, 
In the above, that contributes to a ground rule reversal would help to 
contribute not just once, but several times during the narrative. That 
Is to say, the base principle of Fantasy allows the narrative to Indulge 
In Its thematic multiplicity and so continually exploit the posstblllty 
of a ground rule reversal whenever the subgenerlc context allows for a 
graphematlc shift. Thus the narrative of 'Peeling', as subgenertc 
Fantasy, need not finish With Nile's metamorphic ground rule reversal 
Into a doll that Is shattered and lifeless, but could exploit this 
metamorphosis further by gtvtng Nile life In a different context, 
thereby continuing to make the Impossible possible through the 
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organizing factor of Fantasy's base principle. 
However, since Nile Is not a speaker of subgenerlc Fantasy, she 
cannot :partake in more than one ground rule reversal because the 
magic realist base principle deliberately lm'Okes a reversal of a 
thematic and detailed set of related, binary oppositions. That Is to 
say, the progressive !ogle of the lnferentheme can foreground Nile's 
specific multiplicities because binary oppositions, such as Nile/ dolls 
and dolls/ aborted babies, Initially pair up specific details for the sole 
purpose of collapsing them into each other's contexts. Thus Nile 
becomes a figure who is axiomatically dependent on subgeneric 
Fantasy because Carey, as Author Function, uses the fantastic 
Indicator as a technique In the magic realist performance to Instigate 
that once-only collapse, or reversal. And, because Nile is firmly 
grounded in this magic realist performance, her essentialism, which Is 
so important to the narrator as a body of knowledge, remains in the 
constant state of multiplicities that confronted the narrator in the 
first place. 
In the case of the fantastic as an appropriateness condition, or 
subgeneric indicator, or even as a technique that can be intentionally 
invoked by the Author Function, the axiomatic dependency indicates 
that such a harnessing cannot but Invoke a contextual multiplicity, 
and cannot but invoke a probable reversal of the ground rules at some 
point In the sjuzhet. To write this as an algortthm would be state that 
X < Y [where X = appropriateness condition, subgenerlc indicator, or 
technique, andY= the putative origin, or subgenertc base prtnctple). 
Thus the relationship between the fantastic and Fantasy is similar to 
that of fabulation and Fable. And in this sJmilartty, there Is always a 
probab111ty that previous contexts filter through as a 'non-present 
remainder' or 'trace' by the fact that tterablllty reigns predominant in 
both the larger struo< ·.•re, or the subgenre, and the microcosmic level, 
or the appropriateness condition. 
Before we continue. I would like to discuss the position of those 
readers who might lay claim to Tzvetan Todorov's notion of the 
fantastic rather than Rabkin's. I shall state from the start that I find 
Todorov's structural approach rather unsatisfactory. Todorov [ 1973:3-
23, 44-57) argues that the fantastic Itself is a genre which has not 
only, as Its central proposition, the principle of hesitation, but also 
the posslblllty of several valiant subgenres within Its idealized form, 
something he would call the pure fantastic. Cornwell states that 'In 
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more Todorovtan terms. the fantastic may be present tn a work which 
ultimately turns out to belong (with the resolution of the fantastic 
Issue -or the issue or quality of the fantastic) to the uncanny or the 
marvellous' (1990:31). By the same logic, the fantastic may be present 
in a work that ultimately turns out to belong neither to the uncanny 
or marvellous, but to magic reallsm, modernism, romanticism, or even 
realism. 
From our position stated above, any notion of either an 
Idealized generic form with a su bgeneric varlancy seems simply 
superfluous, given the nature of the appropriateness condition. 
Indeed, to lay claim to the fantastic as a genre In Itself seems rather 
weak, considering the fact that the term genre. in our argument, 
simply means medium. rather than propositional content or styllstlcs. 
Equally. such a claim for the fantastic as subgenre would just be 
another synonomous term for the subgenre of Fantasy Itself. So 1t 
would seem better suited, as we have already argued, to retain the 
concept of subgenre to that which the fantastic is an axiomatic 
dependent. namely Fantasy. so illuminating a more broader scope of 
graphematic play within the appropriateness conditions and their 
participation in other larger structures. 
Todorov's other proposition. the principle of hesitation, seems 
to me to be equally dubious. Todorov argues that 'the fantastic Is 
based essentially on a hesitation of the reader ·a reader who identifies 
with the chief character- as to the nature of an uncanny event' 
(1973:157). He then states that such a hesitation may be 
'acknowledged' either as 'reality' or as 'the fruit of imagination or the 
result of an Illusion', so ultimately It Is up to the reader to decide 
whether 'the event Is or Is not' fantastic (1973:157). The problem with 
such a notion Is primarily the following. So many appropriateness 
conditions can be characterized by a contextual hesitation for the 
Reader Function that they could find themselves In something other 
than a structural realm which stgnlfles the Todorovtan fantastic genre 
or subgenre. One can argue that Todorov's notion is so reader 
dependent that what may seem fantastic for one reader may not be 
fantastic for another. The same can be said for the notion of subgenre 
and structurallty. What may seem structurally like the fantastic for 
one Reader Function, because of this principle of hesitation, may for 
another be, for example, magic realism! All In all. I prefer to 
Incorporate Rabkin's principle on the basis of Its axiomatic 
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dependency, and Its ability (or lterablllty) to lend Itself readily to other 
subgenres in the structural and contextual sense. 
Let us consider the climax and denouement from 'Peeling': 
I take her hand, Wlshlng to reasswe her. It """""""' Itself from 
her body. I am talklng to her. Touchlng her. wishing that she shoukl 
ans\m' me. But wl1h each touch she Is dlsrnenJbeml. sV.vly. Hmb l:!f 
llmb. Untll, headless, annless, legless. I carelesslY ne tey grtp and she 
Jails to the floor. There Is a sharp noise, rather llke l:xmldng glass. 
Bendlng down I ~ among the fragments a small doll, 
ha!Ib;s, e;ekss. and white fium head to tre (1974:32). 
Leavtng aside a general kind of l!terary analysts, one that seJVes 
to explain the nature of the narrative Itself. we shall concentrate, as 
we have done, on the structural Implications of the subgenre and our 
position to the narrative as a participant In that larger structure. We 
will begin by noting that our notion of synecdochic enchantment has 
allowed the Author Function to take the meticulous detail of the 
white dolls throughout the narrative to such a degree that the base 
principle has planted seeds, as It were, at carefully orchestrated 
points. This kind of planting, In conjunction with the sjuzhet, 
generally gives the Reader Function evidence of a type that seems to 
Implicate them 1o a treasure hunt for clues which culminate In a type 
of readlog which, In the case of Carey's stones, tends to be considered 
in desperate need of moral or ethical discussions above all else. 
Hassall wrttes that 'the whole of 'Peeling· Is lndetenntnate In 
status, and all the more unsettling as a result' {1994:14). He also 
states that '{l]t Is Impossible to detemline with any certainty on what 
level the narrator's consciousness, or indeed of reality, these changes 
take place: but they are disturbingly suggestive' (1994:15). I will not go 
Into the problematic nature of such a proposition here, but I wlll state 
that magic realism does seem to revitalize, as I have said before, the 
sjuzhet, the strtngent requirements of adhering to a cause-and-effect 
structure that underlies the written narrative like a framework. Thus 
the earring In 'Peeling'. as an element of meticulous detail, serves to 
slgntfy the cause-and-effect movement Into the climax and 
denouement where the narrator, In seemingly normal sexual advances, 
peels away the woman he desires. It Is a movement based on the 
dialogic Importation of the ghost of the realist base prloclple. 
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Mlller argues that '[t)he significant level In "realist" fiction Is 
always local: local cause and effect operate wtthln cosmic chance, 
unimpeded hy gods and demons' (1986:4). Indeed, by such a structural 
requirement of locality, the white dolls exist perfectly within a 
narrative movement that dictates their Importance at the beginning, 
and somewhat concludes their Importance at the end. In this sense, 
then, the base principle of realism allows for the possibility of an 
explanation by a Iogic that is both local and natural, one does not 
need to search beyond these requirements to determine the movement 
of cause and effect. 
However, the base principle of magic realism, that necessary 
condition which organizes all Importations, whether they be of a 
dialogic nature, such as base principles, or of a graphematlc nature, 
such as appropriateness conditions, demolishes this requirement by 
the fact that both the !nferentheme and the fantastic Indicator have a 
predominant Influence on the way meticulous detail Is discursiVely 
represented and received. Wilson states that 'In magic realism space Is 
hybrid (opposite and conflicting properties are co-present)' (1986:70). 
Thus the Reader Function cannot but explain this Importance by both 
a cause-and-effect explanation, especially at the end, when the dolls 
are rendered equal to their owner, and by the ability to transgress this 
local explanation through the metaphoric status of the denouement, 
giving scope for variant readings. 
Let us dwell upon the notion of the sjuzhet and the nature of 
the dolls. I mentioned that magic realism adheres to a stringent 
cause-and·-effect structure, and 'Peeling' is no exception. It is 
important to mention here that this 'presence' of cause and effect Is 
based on the dialogic importation of the base principle of realism, 
thereby complimenting the 'realism' in the 'magic realism'. This cause-
and-effect structure is. of course, predominant ln the climax where 
the narrator, ln his sexual advances on Nile, sets into motion a series 
of causes and effects. These causes and effects are generally associated 
with their extra-literary counterparts, hence the realism, and so, on 
one level, seem to appear almost normal or natural, such as the 
undressing of the female in anticipation of penetration into a glorified 
essence. 
The narrator himself had stated earlier that 'When I finally take 
her to bed (and I am in no hurry, no hurry at all) I w111 get some better 
idea of her true colour, get under her skin as It were' (1974:23). 
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Interestingly enough, the speech act 'Did you get the pun?' (1974:23), 
following this one made by the narrator, Is grounded In the 
metaftctlonal technique, and one can here speculate that what seems 
like a continuing narrative of the narrator Is, In fact, quite likely to be 
the refracted words of Carey himself, setting the structure up for the 
events that will follow. Thus events that seem natural ultimately lead 
to the dismemberment not only of the female body, but also the 
solution to the mystery of her essence he so desires to uncover. 
Petzold states that to participate In a qualification of '"fantasy" 
(or more appropriately, the fantastic], fiction needs to express a 
conscious departure from, even a rebellion against, the principle of 
mimesis' (1986:15]. As we have seen In the above argument, even the 
base principle of another subgenre, as ghost or trace, can be Imported 
on the basis of the demands of the subgenre In question. This we can 
see occurring In magic realism where the base principle of realism Is 
an object on which the fantastic Indicator can act In order to 
amalgamate Its force Into the context of the larger structure. The 
fantastic indicator functions, therefore. as a complimentary force in 
which the larger structure, namely the subgenre of magic realism, 
explodes the cause and effect that stipulates X as being realist, X 
being whatever narrative acts that may fit those characteristics on the 
basts of the subgenerlc base principle. namely synecdochic 
enchantment, as a necessary condition. Van !kin argues that '(t]he 
story's logic Is that of life and human nature -a logic detetmined by 
processes more profound than mere cause and effect' (1977:29). Thus 
'Peeling', beginning with a woman who collects white dolls and 
organizes her life around them, ends its narrative with a ground rule 
reversal that stipulates her becoming a thing that is equal to the 
material evidence of her life, and that Is to become a doll herself. Such 
Is the nature of the subgenertc illocutlonary forces which constitute 
'Peeling' as a narrative act. 
What we have discussed so far with 'Peeling· and the fantastic 
Indicator can benefit from a brief discussion of the lnferentheme. 
Consider the following extract from the short story: 
I am In no huny. There Is no wgency In the matter. Sooner or later 
we shall dl9cuss the oysters. Then It will be time to nv;e on to otber 
more Intimate things. Imvlng la}cr after la}cr, until! d1oc.cM!r her true 
colours, her flavours, her smells. The prospect of so slow an 
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e>qiofati:m =lies - and 1 am Jn no huny, no huny at an. May 1t 
iast berer(l974:24). 
We can begin by noting that the narrator's anticipating his 
future gratification Is only partly driven by the physical experiences of 
the situation Itself. Much of what amounts to the greater experience, 
tn the eyes of the narrator, Is based on his desire for knowledge, and 
for that knowledge to progress him logically to an even greater 
understanding than before. We may remember the point we made, 
earlier In the chapter, about the lnferentheme and Its ability, as an 
appropriateness condition for magic realism, to borrow epistemological 
principles from subgenertc science fiction. 
It Is time to Illuminate this point a little further with the help 
of a few critics. Daniel reads Carey's 'Peeling· as a perfect example of 
the 'fear that If we peel back the layers of the Infinite onion of the 
universe, there will be nothing, or only an Image, without features' 
(1988: 153). Tate (1987) argues that 'Peeling' presents the female body 
as both mystery and multi-layered text, where the act of peeling 
becomes a celebration of the repression of the feminine and the 
destruction of gender differences, demystlfylng the female body 
through the knowledge that Nile is no longer a threat to the narrator's 
masculinity. And Manning ( 1985:41) writes that 'Peeling· cannot but 
explain Itself psychoanalytically, but in order to do so, the text must 
be Inserted into an existing structure of reality, namely the body of 
knowledge called psychoanalysis. 
Although this comes across as a melange of quotations, the 
Interesting thing to be learned from statements is the alfillatton they 
make with bodies of knowledge as the way in which the text is relfied, 
or explained in order to achieve a degree of comfortable 
understanding. Once again, a cause-and-effect approach is strictly 
adhered to, but each of the critics seems to understand that the 
affiliation they make between bodies of knowledge and the text must 
also include the logical progression of that knowledge towards an 
extreme situation, and ultimately a fantastic scenario. The knowledge 
itself represents part of that process which will eventually lead to the 
lllocutionary force of the fantastic indicator and the perlocutlonm-y 
effect of a ground rule reversal. I have earlier mentioned that the such 
a ground rule reversal may benefit from a conjunctive Involvement 
with the tnferentheme. Indeed, that is exactly what occurs in 'Peeling' 
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and what we have been alluding to In these two paragraphs. For us, 
and for the magic real!st subgenre, thts indicates the Influential force 
of the lnferentheme. 
Carey himself, In Interviews with Maddocks (1981:31-2) and 
WU!banks (1991:49) states that the mystery In 'Peeling' Is the mystery 
of the dolls, they are there In the beginning and In the end, without 
any psychological explanation. and therefore constitute the mystery 
Itself when the narrator discovers that the essence he was searching 
for Is no different from that which he saw and knew of In the first 
place. This search for an essence is, as we have already stated, a 
search for knowledge, and by the lnferentheme's function In the larger 
structure of the subgenre, this knowledge constitutes Itself as a 
critical factor, for the Author Function, In the representation of 
meticulous detaU that wUI lead to the ground rule reversal. Thus the 
oysters, for example, which the narrator will buy because 'She has 
revealed ... a love for oysters' ( 1974:23) will lead to a discussion of that 
body of knowledge which defines them as aphrodisiacs, so leading to 
greater sexual delicacies and discoveries. The logical progression and 
manifestation of such a will to knowledge Is the sexual advancements 
made In the climax of 'Peeling' by the narrator, only to be reversed by 
the ground rule of the white dolls that make up a part of the body of 
knowledge called Nile In the narrative act of the short story. 
Although It borrows Its operative principles from subgenerlc 
science fiction, the !nferentheme does not necessarily organise Itself 
against a background of scientific knowledge on every occasion. It can 
also operate quite happUy In such bodies of knowledge as sexuality, 
theology, or any other methodologies for that matter. Indeed, In 
'Peeling', the body of knowledge taken to Its extreme and logical 
extension Is that which proposes not only to explore, but also to 
define, the essence of 1Noman, gender differences, desire, and 
gratification. What began as a mystery In 'Peeling' remains, by the 
lllocuttonary force of the lnferentheme, as a mystery first, last, and 
always. That Is to say, the narrator Is confronted with various 
'threads' of knowledge, supplied by Nile, which he trtes to separate 
Into 'loose kinds', or 'threads' of Idle chit-chat, and 'the other kind', or 
the 'one that might unravel the whole sweater' (1974:26). It Is 
Important for the narrator to know which one he Is confronted with 
because he 'would prefer to know [the Idle) things, before [he) come[sJ 
to the centre of things' (1974:27). 
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The narrator, therefore, would rather discuss her 'love for 
oysters' (1974:23) than 'the souls of aborted babies' (1974:28), peeling 
away the layers gradually, over the years, until he gets to the 
essentialism of her being. This slow act of peeling Is based on his 
anticipation to gratify the desire for knowledge that will come Into his 
possession, and Is metaphorically characteriZed by his meticulous 
methodology 'In the art of sucking barley sugar' ( 1974:27). But, 
because Nile Is an axiomatic dependent of Fantasy, both by the 
Ulocutlonary force of the fantastic Indicator and, perhaps, the sexual 
whims of the narrator, the !llocutlonary force of the lnferentheme that 
Is parasitically present In her speech acts spUl over Into the narrator's 
acts of Idle chit-chat faster than he can control. 
This onslaught of knowledge entices the narrator to progress 
faster than he would like with his intentions, and so the act of 
peeling, or sucking barley sugar. transgresses from an extended 
Intellectual tlmespace to the Immediate material reality. In this sense, 
clothes are removed with great speed, knowledge is taken to its logical 
extreme, and Nile's essentlallstlc beingness is literally shattered by the 
remaining pieces of a broken, white doll. The inferentheme has taken 
the narrator's desire for wanting to understand Woman's essentialism 
to its logical extreme, returning wllly-nllly back to the multiplicities 
that mark her, and foregrounding the complexity of the larger 
structure called Nile. To return to the analogy of barley sugar. the 
knowledge. like the sweet, has been savoured to Its logically 
progressive end, and the narrator is left with the aftertaste of a 
Socractic reductio ad absurdum. 
Our topic in this chapter has been primarily concerned with 
how the appropriateness conditions, on a microcosmic level, shift 
from a multiplicity of contexts to the status of subgeneric indicators 
within a larger structure, namely the context of subgeneric magic 
realism. In this sense, then, we have been dealing with the notion of 
felicities and infelicities of an act. While Austin (1962) is constantly 
aware that the purity of a performance is an illusion because its 
potential as a definitive performance can be altered by the Infelicity, 
Searle ( 1970) Is quite adamant that the purity of performatlve is not 
only a posslblllty, but a necessary undertaking In order to classify acts 
as acts of a specific lllocutlonary type. For Searle, Infelicities signify 
an unsuccessful performance rather than an alteration in 
performance. His preference to classify a successful performance Is 
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done purely on the basts of central felicities In an Idealized situation 
of the act, or the pure performative (Searle, 1970:55). We, like Derrlda 
(1979), have tried to Incorporate both the felicity and the Infelicity 
Into the classification of the performatlve, preferring to focus on the 
non-serious, the fictional, or an Infelicitous performance like magic 
realism, on the basts that the Infelicity can be as Important as the 
felicity to an analytical and philosophical approach In speech act 
theory. 
What has been our main concern, however, is a combined 
approach of genre theory and speech act theory by the notion that 
appropriateness conditions exist In a graphematlc state, In a 
multiplicity of contexts, prior to their recruitment as subgenerlc 
Indicators with lllocutlonary forces. What I want to distinguish here Is 
the duality of microcosmic chaos and order In the larger structures 
called subgenres. Daniel states that '(t]he Australian New Novel Is a 
prismatic play of mind, ludic and absurdlst, a fabric of hazard, 
paradox, contradiction, Instability -the instability that quantum physics 
shows us Is at the core of things' ( 1988:21. My Italics). Although Daniel 
speaks of the genre of the novel, we can transfer this notion of physics 
and quantum physics to language and the genre of the short story. We 
have, then, what might best be stated as the aporia of structuralism 
and poststructurallsm, working together In a logical contradiction to 
produce chaos and order in the larger structures called subgenres 
which exist In generic media of language. Daniel also states that '(t]he 
logic of cause and effect has been replaced by Heisenberg's Uncertainty 
Principle. Reality is random and literature now has to contend with 
the inherent certainty of matter, a randomness subject to the role of 
the observer -the indeterminacy of the universe' ( 1988: 16). 
Although we may have chaos. uncertainty, and randomness In 
both the quantum level of physics and language, we do have, to a 
greater or lesser degree, order in the larger structures. As we have seen 
In this chapter, magic realism, as one su bgenertc example amongst 
many, has this duality by the appropriateness condition within the 
subgenerlc structure, Its Indicators and their forces. Physicist Paul 
Davies states that '[a)lthough there Is generally no certainty about the 
future states of a quantum system, the relative probabilltles of the 
different possible states are still determlned .... on a macroscopic scale 
where quanturn effects are usually not noticeable, nature seems to 
conform to deterministic laws' (1992:31). Here we have a difference 
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between physics and language because, on a macroscopic scale, the 
quantum effect Is noticeable In language If one understands the 
principle of Uncertainty, or, as It Is most commonly known, the 
concept of d!fferance. Nevertheless, our larger linguistic structures can 
and do display a tendency toward signifying order, even If that order 
Is, from time to time, disrupted by an Infelicity. And when such a 
disruption occurs, when such a shtft from context to context is 
brought Into being, can we not say that such a shift Is not the great 
leap Into chaos but simply an ordered change of contexts? 
Voloshlnov states; 
Anyutlemm!, no matter how ~Wand COlllpkte 1n and of ltsen; Is 
my a rmmentln theantr~.DJspruooss <fveroaJ.ctmUJlbDtn But that 
contlnuons \eltel communlcatlOn Is. In twn, Itself only a moment In 
the continuous, all-lnchtslve, generative process of a given social 
collectlve ... .VerOOI corrununlca1ion can never be understood and 
e>q:tllned a11Side <!this COJ1r>'lifoo with a roncrete sltua/IOTL ~ 
aap.dres l!{e and hlstDrtrolly ~ues prectsely here. In concrete vertJal 
COT111l1lJ11W10 and not In the abstmd llngllistlc system qf lnnguDge 
jorms,rllTtnthe lndJv(dualpsycheqfspealrers (1973:95). 
Thus, while the graphematlc stature of the appropriateness 
condition has the ablllty to Invoke a multiplicity of contexts on the 
quantum level of language, the order of the larger structure 
incorporates such a shift into the verbal processes of its own narrative 
acts. The appropriateness condition Is. like the grapheme, the major 
contender of play In the system. but the system Itself exists within a 
state of order that comprises the context of the speech act. the mode 
of communication, and the transference of meaning in a concrete, 
social, context, or situation. In classing an act, the notion of 
Infelicities and felicities should, therefore, be determined by a 
multiplicity of contexts, a multiplicity of potential speaking sltuatlons 
applicable to that act, and not, as Searle stipulated, by the felicitous 
conditions of some idealized act In some idealized singular context. 
One might say that the base principle of a subgenre Is Its true 
felicity, organizing the appropriateness conditions almost centripetally 
so that they may function as subgenerlc Indicators. But even wlthln 
this proposition, one must be careful of the dialogic Importation of 
other base principles. For If one finds a base principle, one must 
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continue to search, by way of fellci<ies and lnfel!cltles, to see If there 
are any more, and to see, if there are, which ones have been 
dialogically Imported to compliment the lllocutlonary forces of 
subgenelic Indicators within the larger structure. And since we have 
discussed this in our current chapter, what lies ahead is a discussion 
of the total type of Ulocutlon, or the sum total of those forces, so to 
speak, and their relationship between Author Function, Reader 
Function, and the state of closure for the production and transference 
of meaning. Grounding ourselves In the structural analysis of 
chapters one and two. our next chapter will be a reading of the magic 
realist speech act. Our shift from the quantum level to the larger 
structure has, more or less, occurred. 
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Three: Closure Denominators: 'American Dreams'. 
In the previous chapter, we made the distinction between the 
stgntfytng events at the quantum level of language and the subgenre of 
magic realism, as a larger structure, in order to accommodate and 
entertain, within a general scope, the apparentness of a semantic 
order and a semant:~ chaos. Indeed, we argued that every ordered 
context has the probal:•lity of being able to slip Into a multiplicity of 
contexts because our subgeneric Indicator, wtth Its Ulocutlonary force, 
Is equally an appropriateness condition In a system of multiple forces. 
And tn this multiplicity of forces, we have understood that the 
appropriateness condition, like the grapheme, 'can be Imitated, 
and ... tmttates Itself (Derrtda, Limited, Inc., 1979: 167) tn a 
performance of multiple contexts, erasing all strict semantic essences, 
and thereby opening up the text to nurnerous meanings in numerous 
contexts. Furthermore, this principle is based on the Intimate 
relationship between the grapheme and the locu tton as 'tterable 
marks' (Derrtda, Sec .. l979: 187), and on the Derrtdean concept of 
dlfferance. 
To sidetrack briefly, I made the connection between dlfferance 
and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle tn chapter two by stating that 
In language. this principle of Uncertainty, or dlfferance, is noticeable 
in the macroscopic scale, or the larger structure. In the application of 
the Uncertainty Principle In quantum physics, Paul Davies argues that 
'at the subatomic level, where quantum physics is important, a 
collection of particles must be treated holistically. The behavior of one 
particle is inextricably entangled with those of the others. however 
great the Interparticle separations may be' (1992: 158). This Is Indeed a 
proposition which Derrida, in 'Signature, event, context', would 
advocate as a necessity prior to any establishment of locuttonary 
closure. an.d which we have, to the best of our abiH.ty, adhered to in 
chapters one and two. One must hoHsttcally examine the contexts. or 
the possibility of contexts, available to the appropriateness condition, 
especially when It Is lnstltuted as a subgeneric indicator with 
lllocutlonary force In a larger structure. 
In this sense, I would like to extend the holistic proposition 
further because tt ts crucial to the notion of closure we are about to 
discuss. Barthes' famous conclusion, 'the b!rtl: of the reader must be 
at the cost of the death of the Author' (1977:148), has particular 
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importance here. In the same essay, Barthes also stated that 'a text's 
unity lies not In Its origin but In Its destination' (1977:148). Neither of 
these two quotations allows readers to participate In the holistic 
exercise which I deem essential to closure and meaning. For Barthes, 
the text means something at Its destination when It Is In the hands of 
the reader, not In a process of semantic regressslon back to the origin 
of Its production, the author. The problem with such a proposition Is 
one that will constantly resurface In this chapter simply because It Is 
Intimately tied up with the enigma that Is the larger structure known 
as the subgenre. But one major flaw which Barthes does not account 
for Is one that Is hidden within the proposition of his speech act. That 
Is to say, If the text's unity lies In Its destination and not Its origin. 
can we not say that the author, as a Function of literary production, 
Is aware of this factor and thereby consolidates his Authority with the 
understanding that his text will produce a mixed bag of meaning at Its 
point of destination? From a Foucauldian perspective, Lamb points 
out, '[a[s our readings -of Carey's fiction. newspaper and magazine 
Interviews with him. reVIews of his work. and profiles of his life -
Intersect, we are caught up In a different kind of fabrication, or 
production, In which Carey Is forced to play a part, though It Is often 
difficult to gauge how active, or willing, a part' (1992:2). 
Nevertheless, Is It nol true enough to say that this mixed bag of 
meaning, or interpretations, will have some common elements which 
account for a unity within that text al lls point of destination, the 
social context, or the reader as a literary Function in the production 
of meaning? Voloshinov states that the 'word is oriented towards an 
addressee· ( 1973:85), and that 'the printed verbal perfonnance engages 
.. .In ideological colloquy on a large scale: It responds to somelhlng. 
objects to something, affirms something, anticipates pvsslble 
responses and objections. seeks support, and so on' (1973:95). If this 
Is so, and to my mind it Is, then the so-called death of the author 
surrenders all that which had been associated with the author to the 
reader, a surrender which ruthlessly destroys any conscious attempt 
to enter Into the dynamics of the dialogue between author and reader 
as literary Functions In the production and transference of meaning. 
Indeed, a Barthean approach Is based on a closed and artificial 
dialogue between the Reader Function and the IWJgue, projecting 
consciousness on to a non-conscious system. 
Carey states that 'I know that I had all the different Ideas and 
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arguments and threads of things and kept It all In my head, 
everything, as I was wrlttng .... but when the writing Is over, vel}' soon 
afterwards, or as soon as I begin to think about another book, all that 
goes away' (WU!banks, 1991 :50). The point we can make here Is that 
Carey writes with a destination, or semantic direction In mind. He 
writes With an Intentionality suited to his holding both a position of 
Author Function and Reader Function. However, I do not want to 
advocate a type of analysis, for the Reader Function, that attempts to 
get at the total Intentionality, the arguments, different ideas, and 
threads of things, which occupy the mind of the Author Function. 
Such an undertaking Will undoubtedly take the Reader Function to 
the land of Intentional fallacies. When It comes to the production of 
meaning, its transference, and the corresponding notion of an 
Intentionality that directs textual semantics In the larger structure, 
we need to examine all that which Is produced by the Author 
Function, and about the Author Function, as we search for the 
common denominators of a strong closure. Indeed, this Is not so 
much an argument based on the existence of meaning as it is an 
examination of the ex!stence of Authority, and the problem of who 
has Authority In their possession. 
As Petrey states, 'It [o see the text as act, which an Aust!u!an 
approach requires, does not at all force us to construe it as an act 
with one and only one sense. Like the lllocutlonary force of a given 
locution, the meaning of a given text derives from the protocols applied to 
it' (1990:82. My ltal!cs). Fish argues, '[t[hc structure of meantng ... ts 
obvious and inescapable from the perspective of whatever 
Interpretative assumptions [that] happen to be In force' (1980:vi!!). 
Earl!er In his argument, Petrey contended that 'forces [make) l!terary 
words do thtogs for readers [and) must be part of the reading, not lhe 
writing, experience' (1990:81). Like most theorists In the !alter part of 
the twentieth centul)', Petrey's and Fish's positions arc clearly marked 
by the poststructural preoccupation with opentog meaning up to the 
widest possible social context in order not to exclude the margins of 
meaning in the closure of a reading. Indeed, this is not so different an 
approach, as Petrey has indicated, taken up by Austin (1962) when he 
made the ll!ocul!on in a social context the focal point of 
understanding meaning. This is, In our case, equivalent to the 
position occupied by the Reader Function. In the process of an 
analysis, this poststructural position can reap rich rewards from the 
54 
text by Its Inclusion of the reader as a Function In the production of 
meaning, but since It Is not a process that occurs In Isolation from a 
social context, It cannot be a process that excludes the Author 
Function from that social context as a producer of a text In the public 
sphere. 
On the other hand. Searle argues that '[l]n speaking I attempt 
to communicate certain things to my hearer by getting him to 
recognize my Intention to communicate just those thtngs .... He 
understands what I am saying as soon as he recognizes my Intention 
In uttering what I utter as an Intention to say that thing' (1970:43, 
my Italics). For Searle (1970:25: 1983:9), meaning Is the strict 
performance of an lllocutlonary act with propositional content, 
whereby the corresponding Intentional state is expressed with the 
uttering of the propositional content so that the Intentional state, 
Itself, Is a sincerity condttton of the speech act. This set of conditions 
cannot be separated from '[the[ knowledge of how to speak the 
language [that[ involves mastery of a system of rules which renders my 
use of the elements of that language regular and systematic' ( 1970: 13). 
And this, therefore, cannot be separated from a clear transference of 
the addresser's meaning to the addressee because they bot·.l 
understand and share the regular ana systematic mastery of language 
as a system of rules. 
The problem with Searle Is that he participates In that well-
known fallacy of Intentionality as it Is understood in the sphere of 
literature. As I have stated earlier, this Is not the type of 
Intentionality I wish to advocate as the necessary byproduct of 
Incorporating the Author Function Into an analysis. When we speak 
of Intentionality, Authority, and Author Function later In this 
chapter, we are speaking of the Intentions that are equally applicable 
to the Reader Function but do not, in either case, speak of pure 
Intentional states of mind of the human beings who fill those 
Functions In the dynamics of the dialogue. McDonough (1993) states 
that the production and transference of meaning should not be 
reduced either to a causal or mechanistic account of behaviouralism 
because what the speaker may say, what the speaker may mean, 
cannot be traced to the speaker's Internal thought processes, but 
must be determined by what the utterance means In relation to Its 
delivery In an envlronmen t. 
In both Austin and Searle, the problem of Authority and the 
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production and transference of meaning Is clearly outlined by the well 
known literary positions of Author Function and Reader Function. 
Without going Into too much detail, we can safely say that many 
theorists and critics Identify strongly with either one of the two basic 
positions. Indeed, Fish, taking a poststructural stance, sums the 
problem up quite well when he asks, 'Ills the reader or the text the 
source of meaning?' (1980:1). However, the problem with Fish, and 
others like him, Is that the Author Function, as a possible Intentional 
force behind a percentage of the production of meaning and Its 
transference, Is safely eradicated for the notion of the text as the 
source of Authority. This, In turn, makes It easier to deny the text the 
status of Authority because It Is a signifying chain In the 
poststructural sense rather than a product of the user of a chain In 
the Searlean scheme of things, and also because Its appropriateness 
conditions ultimately deny the text a singular context where Its 
privilege of Authority over meaning can occur. The production of 
meaning Is thereby relegated to the status of the reader, who is said to 
write the text at the moment of reading. 
Fish's notion Is not entirely successful to my mind, simply 
because one can, as 1 have suggested in this chapter, debunk the 
reader wlth what one initially debunked the author, especially when 
the reader equally occupies the status of author. Furthermore, this 
scenario does not explain the possiblllty of both the reader's ablllty to 
read something and the reader's desire to want to read something In 
order to understand the signifying direction and message of the 
narrative. If no 'social' dialogue Is entered Into between an addresser 
and an addressee, reganjless of the tlmespace gap between message 
sent and message received, then the only meaning produced is that 
which needed no indicators, or textual direction, In order for the 
transference to occur in the first place. As Bakhtin states, 'one may 
speak of another's discourse only with the help of that allen discourse 
!tself, although in the process. 11 Is true, the speaker introduces into 
the other's words his own intentions and highlights the context of 
those words in his own way' (1981:355). 
If the addre•ser and addressee were one and the same person, 
then the message Is derived wholly from a su bjectivlty that hears not 
the voice of the other In the social context of the word, even If the 
word were written, but hears the word as he or she wishes the word to 
be heard, producing the word as he or she wants It to be produced. 
56 
I 
This may seem extreme, but why should a reader read an allen 
narrative when that reader has the Authorlt".f to the total proceedings 
within the context of its functioning as a larger structure? Petrey 
states that 'Searle makes authorial purpose the sole determining 
factor In !dentil'y!ng fiction: only pretending counts, and the author 
alone can make himself or herself pretend' (1990:67). Indeed, at its 
best, and borrowing Petrey's summation, Fish's argument seems to 
Indicate a total reversal of the Searlean type of Intentionality, gtvtng 
exclusive space, time, and rights to the Reader Function rather than 
an Author Function. 
The problem of Authority Is, to my mlnd, a problem that cannot 
be resolved, or even considered, as either Austin. Barthes, or Fish do, 
by the exclusion of the Author Function when examining the nature 
of any subgenertc speech act. Neither can we exclude, as Searle does, 
the Reader Function from Authority without placing dlalogtsm In 
severe jeopardy. Both Austin and Searle equally entertain valld points 
within the context of their arguments, but each philosopher excludes 
the position that their counterpart deems central to the notion of 
Ulocution and Intention. As Petrey states, '[w]hen Searle allows a 
single person's will to Invalidate a community's speech-act rules, he 
makes Ulocution radically different from what It Is In Austin' 
(1990:68). This problem of Authority, of deciding whether Author 
Function or Reader Function can be the detennining source of the 
producUon of meaning, is one that is mirrored in Carey's finest short 
story, 'American Dreams'; 
But one of us did something. We slighted htm terribly In 
some way, this small meek man with the rimless glasses 
and neat suit who used to stnile so nicely at us all. We 
thought, I suppose, he was a bit of a fool and sometimes 
he was so quiet and grey that we Ignored him, forgetting 
he was there at all (1974:101). 
What bas happened Is that we all. all eight hundred of 
us, have come to remember small transgressions against 
Mr. Gleason who once lived amongst us (1974:101). 
We can begin by asking ourselves the following question: within 
the nature of either Author Function or Reader Function, where does 
the Intention, or Authority, In the production of meaning lie, and If 
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we can find it, does it amou.nt to closure and transference? We would 
have to state, as self-evidence, that any ability to pinpoint 
Intentionality and Authority does, In the sense of 1llocutlonary forces, 
amount to an act of closure occurring within the larger structure. 
However, In all analysis, I do not give preference to an 'either I or' 
distinction, preferring Instead to remain as much as possible within 
the multiple forces of an aporia. The proposition of either an Author 
Function or a Reader Function, acting as exclusive agents of 
Authority Is, to my mind, a fallacy simply because closure Is an act 
that requires participation In the dynamics of the dialogue between 
the two positions. The subgenre of magic realism typifies this 
dlaloglsm by Its harnessing of appropriateness conditions from other 
contexts, and thereby demonstrates that the voice of another, which 
an appropriateness condition can carry within Its graphematlc 
performance, Is a logtcal necessity to the direction of lllocutlonary 
forces, lntentlonalltles, and Authority In the narrative. 
In the ':.:xtracts from 'American Dreams', the voice that is carried 
through tt,e appropriateness conditions of the microtown ls Gleason's. 
And w~ assume. through the narrator's belief In a Sear lean scheme, 
that t.he voice, as the ghost of Intention, comes from the site of origin 
and the will of t:he producer through an intentional act of revenge for 
having been slighted over the years by the American dreaming 
townsfolk. But the narrator equally states, 'My father, who has never 
borne malice against a single liVIng creature, still believes that 
Gleason meant to do us well, that he loved the town more than any of 
us. My father says we have treated the town badly In our minds' 
[1974:101. My Italics). By treating the town badly in their minds, an 
opposite reading to the narrator's Searlean scheme demonstrates that 
the site of origin may not be just Gleason, indicating Instead that the 
intentionality of mlcrotown·s Authority in meaning, Its production 
and transference, lies equally with the narrator and the townsfolk 
themselves. 
In either case, there appears to be a dialogue emerging between 
the recipient of a coded message, or Reader Function, and Its assumed 
producer. or Author Function. A message that further benefits from 
the subgenerlc lllocutlonary force of the fabulist technique in the 
sense that the problem of Authority is a question that cannot simply 
be reduced to an 'either I or' legislation, but needs to benefit from an 
approach that parallels the kind of Investigation undertaken In 
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situation ethics. As the narrator's father states, 'Gleason had built 
the model of our town just for this moment, to let us see the beauty of 
our own town, to make us proud of ourselves and to stop the 
American Dreams we were prone to. For the rest ... was not Gleason's 
plan and he could not have foreseen the things that happened 
afterwards' (1974:108). This view, according to the narrator, Is both 
'sentimental' and 'Insulting to Gleason' (1974:108). The narrator 
states that 'I personally believe that he (Gleason] knew everything that 
would happen' (1974: 108). and on the subject of future proof to affirm 
the narrator's belief, he states that 'Certainly there are In existence 
some personal papers, and I firmly believe that these papers will show 
that Gleason knew exaclly what would happen' (1974: 108). 
In the argument of the narrator, the notion of Intentionality Is, 
as I have said earlier, typically Searlean and deeply connected with the 
will to knowing, at all times, one's act and Its closure In future 
contexts. What the narrator proclaims to know about the reason for 
the mlcrotown's existence Is only one half of the Authority In which 
he Is an equal partner. and by excluding his own contribution, as 
literary Function, to the production and transference of meaning, he 
excludes one half of the performance. The problem with the narrator's 
view Is that to know the act and Its closure at all times, the 
intentionality and Authority one claims Is simply one's own, and the 
repercussions associated with claiming such forthright knowledge is 
its exclusion of the social context. tts exclusion of one's fellow 
speakers, and its exclusion of the conversation that brings life to the 
nature of the subject. the micro town, in relation to the macro town. 
It Is an exclusion which Searle (1992) would later acknowledge 
as the factor which brings his theory of speech -acts to a deadening 
halt because the singularity of speech-acts and their constitutive rules 
do not conform to the sequence of speech-acts in a social context that 
we call conversaUon. This does not entirely exclude, as wt have seen, 
Searle's initial int13nUons from the speech act scene, but it does 
amend that rather exclusive notion of an 'either I or' site of originality 
In Intentionality and Authority. As Austin had stated within the 
context of his written word, the uttered act Is not 'the outward and 
VIsible sign ... of an Inward and sptrltual act: from which It is but a 
short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for 
many purposes the outward utterance Is a descrtption, true or false, of 
the occurrence of the Inward performance' (1962:9). 
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Since the narrator does not see microtown as a speech-act 
performance but as a constatlve example of the Inner will of an 
Individual, namely Gleason, the nature of his predicament Is 
characterized by an 'either I or' fallacy. It Is either true of false that 
Gleason could not have foreseen the future events of his act. Since 
the narrator does not see that his entrapment within the cycle of 
tourism Is grounded not In the will of Gleason but In his own, his 
conclusion Is based on the exclusion of the social performatlve, of the 
diversity that marks his participation In the dynamics of the dialogue 
and an Authority that Is both singular and his own. In this Searlean 
context, the narrator himself remains an act of singularity. a 
performance dictated by the constitutive rules of mlcrotown where 
'They [the Americans) come In search of me and my petrol pump as 
they have done for four years now. I do not await them eagerly because 
I know, before they reach me. that they w!ll he disappointed' 
[ 1974: 112-3). For the narrator, the performance that occurs daily In 
macrotown Is marked by the constitutive rules of the mlcrotown, and 
not by the conventions of the social performance that make up the 
equal partnership of Authority between Author Function and Reader 
Function, between Gleason and the townsfolk. 
Austin, however, argued that 'the act Is constituted not by 
Intention or by fact, essentially. but by convention (which Is. of course. 
a fact)' (1962:128. My Italics). Thus where Authority In meaning Is 
considered to lie exclusively with the townsfolk themselves, with 
conventions, the dialogue Is one that is generated in the social 
context of a multiplicity of speakers, each tied In some way to the 
other by the commonality of having offended Gleason and bearing 
guilt for the offence. The problem with such a reading of the situation 
Is that 'fact' is considered to be wholly determinable by a democratic 
agree1nent, and that the conventions which followed are based on the 
exclusion of the Intentions of the Author Function. however small 
they might be. Gleason may never have been offended personally, but 
he may have been saddened by the pu bile trials and tribulations that 
the town suffered in the minds and words of the townsfolk, thus 
manufacturing a model to Illuminate the plurality of small scale 
beauty tn the town by creating a dialogue between the two. 
We must disagree with Austin that the act Is not constituted by 
intention because to do so would be to exclude a percentage of the 
!llocutionary force that drives the act In a direction towards closure. 
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Within the context of the townsfolk and the social conventions of 
what they consider to be fact, the tourism that Imprisons their lives 
may very well be the product of their Intentions and their Authority In 
transferring meaning from the closure of mlcrotown to the social 
context of macrotown. To reiterate the statement made by the 
narrator's father, Gleason's Intentionality and Authority may just 
have been 'to let us see the beauty of our own town, to make us 
proud of ourselves .... (and that Gleason! could not have foreseen the 
things that happened afterwards' (1974:108). 
So, like the Austlnlan and Searlean opposition between society 
and lndlvlduality, both the positions of Author Function and Reader 
Function, within the context of the lllocutlonary force and the closure 
of the subgenerlc speech act, determines the production and 
transference of a meaning. And because they are both equally valid, 
and because they are both more complimentary In the dynamics of a 
dialogue, It Is much more appropriate to look for the common 
denominators, or closure denominators, such as the fabulist 
technique Indicating a need for situation ethics In the above, that 
creep Into the discourses of both Author Functl<'n and Reader 
Function as discursive positions. Just as appropriateness conditions 
can incorporate more than one context in the illocutlon of a subgenertc 
indicator, so too can appropriateness condltlons incorporate both the 
Author Function and the Reader Function in the contextual closure q{ an 
illocutton. In an Interesting narrative strategy undertaken by Ryan-
Fazllleau (1991), Carey. although divorced from the interpretative 
possibilities of his work in the public domain, is said to prolong his 
Authority of his short stories by his participation In confilctlng 
symbols, or leads, and, being elusive to pin down critically, Is thereby 
constantly overturning the Authority of the Reader Function over his 
texts. 
What I find Interesting about this reading Is the notion that 
closure denominators are part of the tripartite structure In which both 
the appropriateness condition and the subgeneric Indicator are Its 
composites, that the leads, or subgenerlc Indicator, as a closure 
denominator by lllocutlonary force. can lead equally Into the 
multiplicity that is foregrounded by the magic realist subgenre. But 
even so, the ab111ty to shift contexts, if and when It does occur In a 
polemic exercise such as deconstruction, ultimately results In the play 
of an Authority that exists In another, affiliated, larger structure, 
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especially when closure Is the deciding factor of the narrative. Ryan-
Fazllleau's reading, therefore. best demonstrates the nature of the 
appropriateness condition to the illocutlon In the larger structure of 
the subgenre and In the dynamics of the dialogue between Author 
Function and Reader Function. 
In that sense, the exclusive origin of Intentionality that 
produces meaning within the !llocutlonary forces of 'American 
Dreams' is never resolved. Nor does it need to be. Leaving aside, for 
the moment, the narrative ortgln of Carey as Author Function and our 
receptive role as Reader Function, the question of Intentionality and 
Its origin Is left clearly In dualistic play. Is It Gleason, In some act of 
revenge because 'we have treated the town badly In our 
m!nds'(l974:101), or Is It the narrator and the citizens of the town 
who themselves have created the predicament of their dreams? 
Perhaps It Is both. 
In any case, the analysis can bear much fruit to the extensive 
play of meaning between the literary and extra-literary enVIronments. 
The appropriateness conditions allow for a rich multiplicity of 
contexts to occur in a dynamic dialogue between Author Function and 
Reader Function, some of which will be closed, even If tentatively, by 
common denominators, and others which will remain speculative, but 
equally useful. by their ability to rel.terate a further multiplicity of 
contexts. Nevertheless, what is clear Is the simultaneous demand on 
both Author Function and Reader Function In a dialogue that shapes 
the dynamics of the production and transference of meaning. 
Intentionality and illocutton arc subject to the common denominators 
communicated by the narrative, inespectivc of theoretical discipline. 
Variance from a common theme. or an inferentheme, is the stuff of 
which disciplines are made, and for which narratives cater. 
This example of microtown and macrotown leaves us with a 
paradox that needs to be addressed. Indeed, the base principle of the 
magic realist subgenre, synecdochic enchantment, within the context 
of 'American Dreams', allows us, tn conjunction with the 
lnferentheme and the fantastic Indicator, to discuss the mlcrotown/ 
macrotown construct as an analogy for the aporia between a system 
that keeps on playing and the acts of closure that occur as a result of 
that play. Like Petrey's protocols and Fish's Interpretative 
assumptions discussed earlier In tbis chapter. Denida argues, '[ t)here 
Is a labor -metaphysical or not- performed on conceptual systems' 
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(Sec,J979:195). It Is In this labor towards dosure that we must 
consider both the felicities and the Infelicities of the larger structure 
because we need to be aware of the fact that subgenerlc Indicators. or 
words, can do more than one thing in one context at any given time. 
Thus we are well aware of the fact that the Reader Function can derive 
a multiplicity of Interpretations from a magic realist narrative because 
the appropriateness conditions that make up the subgenre 
continuously play within a multiplicity of contexts, each, In turn, 
performing to the base principle of another larger structure. 
Closure, therefore, Is an act of labor that Is momentary and 
contextual to the Reader Function's beliefs or reasons as to why a 
particular explanation of a subgenerlc act Is the way It Is, or why a 
particular Author Function has written the way he or she has chosen 
to write. Once again, the narrative strategy of Ryan-Fazllleau, 
outlined In this chapter, Is a particularly fruitful example of this set 
of circumstances. We can never close the system, we can only close our 
acts. Thus while a Reader Function may produce an act of closure on 
the work of a particular Author Function, such an act of closure, 
especially when It Is a written verbal performance, Institutes that 
Reader Function as an author In the position of Author Function. The 
dualism of such an Institutional status Is equally subject to the 
participatory action of the self-same Reader Function or another 
Reader Function ad Lnjlnltum. In Hegelian terms of !he master and 
slave analogy, '!the master] has become aware of his dependence on 
his slave; that he himself is reduced to slave because he cannot be 
master without the second self-consciousness' (Rice, 1974:366). Such 
Is the nature of Authority In the larger structure. 
Let us examine this proposition further within the context of 
the microtown and macrotown analogy. Indeed. we can state that, 
while the two can be cited In a binary opposition, they do In fact eXIst 
in the forces that constitute the poststructural hierarchy. Such a 
master I slave interdependency is all pexvasive when we consider that 
the townsfolk believe themselves to be Imprisoned by the Authority of 
Gleason's model town. But we should also consider the fact that this 
Interdependency ls conditional. Gleason's position as the master Is 
based on the d!aloglsm that unites the macrotown with the mlcrotown 
In the minds of the townsfolk. The unity Is generated by the narrative 
that seems to explain the Intentional origin of the current 
predicament. However, what the townsfolk fall to notice, and what the 
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Reader Function of 'American Dreams' can understand by the magic 
realist subgenre, Is that the larger structure does not wholly determine 
the context from whtch the narrative ts supposed to ortgtnate. 
In the short story, the mlcrotown Is the narrative; It Is the 
larger structure which can be read and analysed with closure of Its 
meaning In mind. By the base principle of magic realism, the 
mlcrotown Is built on meticulous detail, and It harnesses the 
approprtateness conditions of the macrotown in its own terms in order 
to exert lllocutionary forces onto the multiplicity of contexts that 
exist in the macrotown. But mtcrotown does not wholly determine that 
which can possibly occur ln macrotown because its narrative can only 
close specific contexts. if, and only if, mtcrotown ts conceived as the ortgtn 
of Authority will it sustain a degree of specific closure In the Searlean 
scheme of thtngs. Otherwise, it ts subject to a deferral of closure tn the 
dlffering contextual multiplicities untU such time both Author Functton and 
Reader Function implement a tentative closure on the basts of the 
dynamics of their dialogue. 
For example, while the narrator's father Is narrated in the 
microtown as having a fascination with bicycles and gears for time 
immemorial, the father in the macrotown not only runs ·a petrol 
station [but[ he was also an inventor' (1974:102). In the macrotown, 
the multiplicity of contexts exists simply because of the self-
performatlvlty of the appropiateness conditions, namely its people and 
culture. We must remember that, unlike the narrator. his father is 
much more sympathetic to what he thinks Gleason's reasons might 
have been. Perhaps it was, after all, to let the townsfolk see the beauty 
of their own town rather than escaping into the towns. or cities, of 
American dreams. But because we are caught up in the word of the 
narrator, this small point made by the father, and perhaps a refracted 
word of Carey as Author Function, is relegated to the margins by the 
Authority and Intentionality that Is constructed through the narrator 
In his performing the cyclic and singular predicament of the larger 
structure In which he dentes his equal partnership of Authority. 
This analogy of the mlcrotown as the larger structure, the 
subgenre, and the macrotown as the quantum level of language. Is 
equally applicable to the other short stories that we have discussed In 
the previous two chapters. Consider the dolls in 'Peeling' and how they 
conform to the combined force of synecdochic enchantment and the 
inferentheme In attempting to produce, for the narrator, the larger 
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structure, or the narrative, on Nile. At all times, Nile remains at the 
quantum level of language, and Is thereby able to be thrown Into the 
multiplicity of contexts by an act of peeling that brings the larger 
structure back to its graphem.atic nature of appropriateness 
conditions. Even In 'Report on the Shadow Industry', the analogy 
finds a place. It Is the production of shadows that Indicate the 
presence of some larger structure, and their consumption that 
determines the extent to which the larger structure relies on its 
approprtat.eness conditions that shift In a multiplicity of contexts. 
I mentioned earlier In the chapter that we need to undertake a 
search for the common denominators of a strong closure, and this 
would allows us to agree upon that which constitutes the closure 
denominators. Thomas, discussing the Principle of Charity, states 
that '[w)hen analyzing reasoning, always analyze it in the way that 
Interprets It as the strongest possible reasoning compatible with the 
inference indicators In the discourse' (1986:18). Although this 
Principle is derived from propositional logic, it does the Reader 
Function no harm to appropriate Its directives to the analysts of 
subgeneric indicator~ in the larger structure of the narrative. Let us 
now consider. therefore. how closure denominators, as leads 
constructed by Carey, allow for two common readings of 'American 
Dreams'. We are here, of course, returning to the extra-literary 
conditions of postn'loden11sm and postcolonialism, outlined in chapter 
one, as a possibillty for magic realism. 
In an interview with Willbanks, Carey has stated that' !w]c are a 
culture of fixing somethtng up, making do with what's available, 
rather than creating something new. Ours is a failure of confidence' 
(1991 :53). And in an earlier interview with Van !kin, he stated that 
'most of nw characters live in a spiritually impoverished world which 
they don't feel part of (1977:33). In conjunction with the magic realist 
subgenre and its appropriateness conditions, both these statements 
allow for the Reader Function to perform an analysis that is strongly 
suggestive of the postmodem extra-llterary condition. Lamb, therefore, 
Is able to argue that "'American Dreams" Is a haunting parody of 
Australia's eagerness to adopt the superficiality of American 
materialism as a banner of success' (1992: 18). This state of parody, or 
pastiche, so central to postmodemlsm is what allows the townsfolk of 
'American Dreams' not only to adopt American materialism as the 
banner of success, but also to adopt the 'romantic' spiritualism that 
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accompanies such dreams of success In their splrltually Impoverished 
world. 
Selden argues that '[t)he postmodern experience Is widely held 
to stem from a profound sense of ontological uncertainty' (1985:72). In 
'American Dreams', the nature of being Is constantly questioned by 
the lntertextual uncertainty of the mlcrotown's status of narrative 
and macrotown's multiplicity of contexts by Its appropriateness 
conditions. In the concluding paragraphs of the story, the question of 
which town Is real and which town Is a 'clever forgery' (1974:113) Is 
debated when the American tourists cannot see a similarity between 
the micro-narrator and the macro-narrator. Is microtown a parody of 
the dreams and people In macrotown, or Is It the reverse? What had 
once been the dream that brought the community together In a 
transcendental state of perfection now divides that community by the 
fragmented playfulness of the dream's 'rear existence In both 
microtown and macrotown. That is to say, the dream of American 
materialism and spiritualism has become the recurring reality of what 
it means to exist for the extreme wants and needs of popular 
culturlsm, to exist as a product In both the physical and metaphysical 
worlds of commodity consumplton. That Is the logical extension of the 
inferentheme's illocutionary force and the ground rule reversal of the 
fantastic indicator in a postn10dern context. 
Indeed, the town exists as both closure denominator and 
cmnmodity between Author Function and Reader Function, between 
Gleason and the narrator, and between Carey and ourselves. It is 
through the town's eventual classification as a tourist attraction that 
the postmodern condition exerts lts strongest force in the text. In 
conjunction with the base principle, the town In all lls meticulous 
detail, becomes the object of analysis, Interpretation, and media 
classification to the extent that the larger structure Is sh.:>wtng signs 
of being peeled away Into Its appropriateness conditions. As the 
narrator states, 'the next day we were all over the newspapers. The 
photographs of the model people side by side with the photographs of 
the real people. And our names and ages and what we dld were all 
printed there In black and white' (1974:111). 
Falgley argues that, In postmodern theory, 'the subject Is an 
effect rather than a cause of discourse' (1992:9). This Is, of course, 
most typified by the American dreaming that occurs In the short story. 
For the narrator and the townsfolk to dream of 'blg smooth cars 
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cruising through cities with bright lights', 'expensive night clubs', 
malting 'love to women like Kim Novak and men like Rock Hudson' Is 
to dream the dream that Is produced by Hollywood's motion picture 
packages. Subjectivity, In this postmodern sense, Is the effect of a 
speech act that evolves with the Increasing desire to produce new 
stimuli for gratification. However, the dream's potency at the level of 
tourist attraction Is so predominant that at the level of the ground 
rule reversal, the tnferentheme Institutes the logic of another body of 
knowledge that causes dispute between the American tourists, who 
seek gratification, and the townsfolk, who are unable to gratifY, as 
tourist attraction. As we have already discussed, what Is analysed and 
Interpreted tn the macrotown Is believed to be, as tlmespace is subject 
to change, an Infelicity of the micro town. 
Ross states that '[t]he wall that encloses Mr. Gleason's secret 
also has Its parallels In the labyrinths that figure so often In Borges' 
fiction' (1990:53), and that '[f]or Carey, the metaphor of the labyrinth 
emerges not only as a metaphysical structure that turns inward and 
devours Itself but also as a physical entity' I 1990:54). Indeed, this 
notion of the labyrinth can be argued as the appropriate metaphor for 
the postmodern preoccupation with the parody or pastiche. Like the 
magic realist subgenre itself. the microtown acts as a metaphor for the 
increasing space that the larger structure occupies once the Amertcan 
tourist, as a Reader Function, enters its domain of appropriateness 
conditions. The townsfolk, however, cannot see this ever increasing 
space because they themselves arc an effect of the timespace play of 
appropriateness conditions. When Initially faced with their own 
labyrinth, all they can see Is 'the big wall [surrounding the top ofj 
Bald Hill' II974:104) and the 'small blind wall that had been obVIously 
constructed this special purpose' I 1974: I 05). Once the walls come 
down, once the larger structure Is peeled away, their ability to see past 
the blind wall Into their own status as appropriateness conditions 
becomes so foregrounded that they collapse Into the labyrinth of their 
own fragmented and displaced identities. 
I have already mentioned In chapter one that postcolonlalism, 
as extra-literary condition, reinvents that which Is the focus of the 
narrative. Within the context of our argument, the opportunity ts 
made available, through the appropriateness conditions, for the shift 
from one larger structure to another affiliated larger structure to 
occur. This Is possible due to the multiplicity of contexts we have 
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already discussed, and because a single context must inadvertently 
have within Itself the performatlvlty of another, affiliated, context. 
Thus postmodernlsm, has at all Urnes, the possibility of 
postcolonialism within the context of Its extra-literary condition. 
What we might consider to be an Infinite play of parody or pastiche 
can indeed form the basis of a cultural reinvention. Indeed, 
postcolonialism Itself Is marked by a contextual shift In the larger 
structure on the quantum level of language. 
Fletcher ( 1991 I argues that Carey uses hts c'laracters In a 
satiric manner as vehicles of exposure for the concepts of 
Imprisonment and colonial hegemony which are prevelant In much 
Australian literature. Thus we could argue that an exposure tn such a 
manner helps to give rise to an acceptance of historical multiplicities 
and may further help the move toward cultural reinvention In the face 
of the Infelicities which continually play In our Anglo-Celtic national 
identity. In "American Dreams', this type of reinvention by the 
Incorporation of Infelicities Is avoided In order to keep the !den tlty of 
the American dreamers, and the hegemony of the ministry of Tourism, 
Intact In the face of the adulterous relationship discovered In 
microtown and macrotown. As the narrator states, 
We looked at the mlnlsler mlstmstfully, wondertug If he knew about 
Mrs. Cavanagh. and he must have seen the look bxause he said that 
certain controversial Items would be removed. had already been 
rernooed. We shifted In our seats. like you do when a particularly 
tense part of a film has come tn Its climax. and then we relaxed and 
llstened to what the mlnlster had to say. And we all began, once 
more, to dream our American dreams ( 1974: Ill. My ltallcs). 
The fact that Gleason knew of Mrs. Cavanagh and young Craigie 
Evans further triggers the possibility, In the minds of the townsfolk, 
that he knew of many more Infelicities that played within the 
appropriateness conditions of macrotown. Indeed, the minister for 
Tourism's arrival In the town signals the relief townsfolk feel In the 
presence of an Authority, of an Author Function, that exceeds the 
Intentional forces of Gleason through mlcrotown. In the face of the 
idealistic prosperity that accompanies the word of the minister for 
Tourism, the narrator states, 'once more, we changed our opinion of 
Gleason' (1974: ill). What the townsfolk do not realise Is that, In the 
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future, their fragmented and displaced Identities are the logical 
progression of their own desire and gratification for a felicitous 
narrative that accommodates the wants and needs of a body of 
knowledge as well as the popular culturalism of their choice. At the 
level of the ground rule reversal, the lnferentheme takes the townsfolk's 
choice readily to the level of a popular Institution, tourism. 
McSherry, commenting on the repercussions of this status quo 
In the extra-literacy environment of the text, states that 'Australians 
have apathetically accepted the control by foreigners whether through 
industry or cultural ideals. Not only are the workers trapped In 
meaningless jobs but their labour Is owned by foreigners and If they 
dream of escape they dream American not Australian dreams' ( 1983/ 
84:86). While the Implied conclusions In McSherry's argument come 
across as idealistic essentialism in the face of an everpresent dynandc 
of appropriateness conditions, or Australian multiculturalism, her 
allusion to cultural and Industrial hegemony Is an Important 
prel..!ursor to the performances that make up a percentage of the 
tllocuu.-. n.s in both 'American Dreams' and the extra-!iterary reality of 
the Reau.:• Function. When Sage argues that 'Carey's people are 
ontologtcally ·J,,::i '"~ed' ( 1995: 18), her proposition has equal force for 
the Reader FuncUc.a within the context of'Amertcan Dreams'. 
That Is to say, a challenge of origin, or beingness, is drawn 
between the Carey character In the literacy reality, and the character 
of the Reader Function In the extra-literary reality. It is a 
metaphysical comparison designed to foreground the gaze qJ ontological 
uncertainty made by hegemonic tourists, demanding to be reassured by 
the townsfolk, as objects of the gaze, that no difference exists between 
their pseudo-Australian dreams of macrotown, generated by micro town 
as the origin, brochure, or guage, and the corresponding macrotown of 
the townsfolk's American dreams. 'On Bald Hill there arc half a dozen 
telescopes through which the Americans can spy on the town and 
reassure themselves that it is the same down there as it is on Bald 
Hill' (19'74:112). B,;t the difference Is, of course, that Amerlemo 
tourists can step out of their Australian dreams while the Australian 
townsfolk are Increasingly caught. as time progresses, In the lunacy of 
having to perform In the ftxed Ideals of an American dream that 
constructs them as products of the ontological gaze. As time 
progresses, It is the American tourist who controls the American 
dreams and ontology of the Australian townsfolk, and not the 
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Australians themselves. 
In an Interview with Wyndham, Carey states that '[m]ost of my 
work has been to do with what It means to be Australian, which Is a 
bit 19th century but also, for me and for Australians, Vitally 
Important because [we are] still concerned about finding ourselves' 
(1994:48). Once agatn, It Is Important that we understand that not all 
magic realist speech acts concern themselves with the postcolonial, 
but In the case of 'American Dreams', what we find Is the forerunner 
to much of the postcolonial Issues that thematically occupy the 
narratives of Carey's later novels. Hassan states that '[l]n his two 
earlier volumes of short stories, Carey charts the lives of a collection 
of physical and I or psychological pygmies who seek to master "the 
system" but end up Instead as Its Inmates and victims or on display as 
Its clowns' [1989:652). 
Thus a combination of these two readings, of the postmodern 
and the postcolonial extra-literary conditions, forms the basis of an 
Intention,• illy that belongs to Carey as Author Function, and to which 
we contribute as Reader Functions in the dynamics of the dialogue we 
have called Authority. Even the magtc realist subgenre gtves preference 
to this kind of dialogic Interaction by the appropriateness condition's 
ab!lttes to produce tnfel!ctties tn the larger structure. Closure In the 
narrative, therefore, ts determined by both tnfellctttes and felicities to 
the types of speech acts that theoretical disciplines Illuminate in their 
methodological analysts. And, as we have stated earlier In this 
chapter,just as appropriateness condltfons can Incorporate more than one 
context tn the lllocutlon of a subgenertc indicator, so lao can 
appropriateness conditions incorporate both the Author Function and the 
Reader Function in the contextual closure of an lllocutton. Thus closure Is 
not <' c imposstb!ltty within a system that can tin ucs to play as long as 
its exphnatory scope is grounded In the Principle of Charity for both 
the felicity and the Infelicity. In either case, one context leads to the 
multiplicity of contexts. If we recall the father's statement mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, we can perhaps conclude that Gleason's 
intentionality over macrotown through microtown is determined by 
the direction and message of mlcrotown's Indicators pointing to the 
initial beauty of macrotown, rather than exerting a force of eventual 
imprisonment over the townsfolk In their American dreams. 
Indeed, It could well be argued that Gleason's mlcrotown 
allowed for a postcolonial reinvention of macrotown, but the 
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townsfolk, treating the town badly In their minds, let their town and 
themselves slip Into the logical status of mlcrotown as a postmodern 
tomist attraction, or what Baudrlllard ( 1983) would call the hyperreal. 
Thus 'American Dreams', as a narrative in the larger structure of 
magic realism, foregrounds the multiplicity and self-participation In 
the construction of an Identity through appropriateness conditions In 
both the literary and extra-literary realities. Every appropriateness 
condition associated with a context has the ability to shift and be 
shifted, thereby altering the illocuttonary force of the larger structure 
under examination. And, with such a shift, there wlll also be a 
reinvention of the Infelicities, alongside the alre~.dy known felicities, 
that Institute the !llocutlonary acts and forces of the subgenerlc 
speech act. Thus, by the larger structure of magic realism, the Reader 
Function, through an understanding of 'American Dreams', Is left 
with an awareness of the multiplicity of appropriateness condition. of 
contexts and forces, that make up the Australian Identity, the 
Australian speech acts. and ultimately, the Australian speech genres. 
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Conclusion. 
While this thesis bears the title Speaking Magic Realism, It could 
equally be considered a pseudonym for the broader philosophical 
approach which we may categorize as a speech act theory of parasitic 
discourse. The point, which must always be considered, Is that the 
analysis of !llocuttons does not need to be solely governed by either an 
Austln!an or Searlean !nvesttgatton, especially when It comes to the 
cross fertilization of lllocutlonary acts In both ordinary and parasitic 
circumstances. This Is not to suggest that current and P"tentlal speech 
act theorists abandon Austlntan or Searlean methodologies, but to 
remind them that the stance they take to parasitic dtscurslvlty 
reduces the analysis of, and conclusions on, the nature of ordinary 
discourse, or language as a philosophical field. 
When Austin gives an example of a performatlve misfire In Don 
Quixote, he Is not only contradicting his own conclusions on !he 
distinctions between ordinary and parasitic, but he also demonstrates 
that his contradiction holds a viable truth for the Inclusion of the 
parasite Into the Aust!nlan scheme of things. For us, this translates 
Into the equal consideration of both ordinary and parasitic whenever 
we discuss the speech act. Although we have mainly concentrated on 
parasitic discourse In this thesis. further research could look at how 
the !llocuttons of speech acts are both the product of ordinary and 
parasitic circumstances, and how a combination of the two help to 
illuminate the act in question as well as the forces it releases during 
the course of a perfonnance. 
In this sense, then, the thesis has given, as already stated, a 
single, subgener!c example of a type of speech act In a myriad of acts. 
The choice to analyse magic realism was primarily based on its overt 
foreground!ng of the multiplicity of appropriateness conditions, and 
thus helped to establish a methodology which Is possibly much easter 
than existing ones. However, It Is my contention that the methodology 
In this thesis Is applicable to all subgener!c acts, although I do 
entertain the possibility that within each and every subgener!c act, 
the larger structure w!ll change the methodology In a manner that Is 
relevant to its conditions under examination. One n1ust remember 
that this thesis Is about the nature of the conditions In a subgenertc 
performance, and how those conditions translate Into Indicators with 
!llocutlonary forces. Each and every narrative participates In a 
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performance of some type or another. Thus all narratives are 
positioned in the propositional content of a subgenre where the base 
principle organizes the multiplicity of appropriateness conditions Into 
a larger structure recognizable to the Reader Function. Further 
research Is needed to take this methodology and seek to apply it 
elsewhere, Uluminatlng the performances. or propositional conte"ts of 
subgenres other than magic realism. 
In the case of genre theory, the propositional content of the 
subgenre complements one half of the contactjunctlon in our model of 
the Functions of Language. Indeed, this thesis has mainly concerned 
Itself with the types of lllocutlonary Influences that the propositional 
content of a subgenre, namely magic realism, exerts during the course 
of a narrative performance. Further research needs to examine the 
Influences of the other half of the contact junction, namely the medium 
that enframes a particular narrative performance. That Is to say, what 
type of tllocutlonary forces, If any, do the media exert on the types of 
performances under investigation? With respect to magic realism, we 
have made minor mention of one media influence, and that is the 
predominance of the short story's sjuzhet In the subgenerlc magic 
realism of Carey's narratives. 
We have not, however, had the opportunity to examine in full 
the effects and Influences of the types of lllocutions that such a 
component of the medium in the contact.functlon exerts during the 
course of a narrative performance. Thus, an area of research that 
needs to be undertaken is that which pertains directly to the media 
employed during narrative performances in the contact.functlon. One 
only needs to consider what types of influences make the short story 
different from other larger structures, such as the novel, poetry, or 
drama, tn order to begin postulating differences between poettc 
illocutions. dramatic illocutions, and novelistic illocutions. 
Furthermore, this notion of examining the media in the contact 
junction simultaneously wllh the propositional content does not stop 
short of parasitic discourse. Indeed, ordinary language could benefit 
from such an analysis In order to establish the Influences of speech 
genres In dally speech. Two parasitic examples of the Influence of 
speech genres can be found in the classic characterizations of Emma 
Bovary and Don Quixote. where the performances of each character 
mirror the types of posstblllties In the literary reality, during the 
cross-fertilization of ordinary and parasitic dlscurstvlttes tn the 
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performance of a single speaker. In the extra-literacy reality, such a 
concurrence can occur between the socio-conventional understanding 
of lllocutlons and the particular lllocutlonary acts of a substratum of 
speakers. In layman's terms, the appropriation of a denotative word 
within the connotative circumstances and conditions of a vocational 
group could be traced back to the particular generic and subgenertc 
constnlCUons of the contact junction. 
All In all, while one can always practise either an Austlnlan or 
Searlean method of speech act theory In ordinary circumstances, the 
pervasive nature of parasitic discourse, as evidence to the contracy, 
suggests that an Austlnlan or Searlean approach Is not the apotheosis 
of the theory Itself. indeed, our model of the Functions of Language 
makes space for the Austlnlan and Searlean approaches In the 
functlonnl level of the code, but, as the genre/ subgenre alliance of 
the contactjunction Implies, the 1llocutlons of parasitic discourse are 
equally applicable to ordinary circumstances. If language Is the 
organizing force of that entity we call consciousness, then it acts as a 
base principle for the architectonics between speakers and their 
stratified worlds. What characterizes language must characterize 
consciousness, and If language in ordinary circumstances creates and 
marks the conventions of our thought, then parasitic discourse 
cannot but do the same thing because of itS colourful existence within 
and reliance upon the codes that mark 'ordinary' language. Without 
ordinary language, we cannot have the organized basics of linguistic 
thought, and without its parasitic equal. we cannot have the colourful 
multiplicity that marks variance in concepts, nor the stylistic variance 
of stratified speakers as living Author and Reader Functions. 
The stratified speaker, whether ltterary or not. occupies a 
unique space and time within the word by the suhgenre In which that 
speaker forges his or her name and signature. Who, then, is the 
narrator of 'American Dreams'? He is the ideologue of a bourgeoisie 
and a secular hedonism that has stylized the Australian social strata 
since Federation. He prefers the narrative of global culture, rather 
than the cringe of parochialism, under the hegemony of fashionable 
Americanism. He Is the product of both parasitical and ordlnarsr 
discursive circumstances. He is, like any other speaker, whether 
literary or not, a product of the speech genres that Interest him and 
mark him. He is, in terms of consciousness, an lllocution. 
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